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RACE AND ORIGINAL
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PROLOGUE
[FIRST WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: I mean-I didn't want to be like Ernie
Banks. I wanted to be Ernie Banks.
[SECOND WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: Mr. Cub.
[FIRST WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: And, it never really dawned on me that
he was black you know?
[SECOND WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: Wrist hitter.
[FIRST WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: I was, you know, seven years old. And
he was just Ernie Banks. He was my hero.
[SECOND WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: All in the wrists.
[FIRST WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: There weren't any black people in my
town. At least I don't think there were.
[SECOND WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: Mister Cub.
[FIRST WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: Is it eight o'clock? Jeez, will you look
at that. This is really something, huh? Wander in here off the street. I
mean if people would just sit down and talk like this more often.
[SECOND WHITE PROFESSIONAL]: Communication. That's what it's all
about.
[BROTHER FROM ANOTHER PLANET: No response.]
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lished manuscript). The opinions expressed are my own and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Joint Center or the MacArthur Foundation which provided support for this research. This
Article was presented to the Midwest Law Professors of Color on February 10, 1990, and I benefited
from the comments made at that conference on this paper by Norman Amaker, Robin Baird, Linda
Greene, Jim Jones, Joe Knight, Beverly Moran, and Leland Ware. I also would like to thank my
colleagues for their helpful comments-particularly Kate Bartlett, Walter Dellinger, David Lange,
H. Jefferson Powell, Christopher Schroeder, and John Weistart. In addition, in the Fall of 1989 I
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of Michigan School of Law and this Article is better due to criticism of some of the ideas in that
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whose example as scholar, diplomat, and teacher has been an inspiration to me. Thanks also to my
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Conversation of two white professionals lost in Harlem with a black
mute alien from another planet.'
I. INTRODUCTION: AN AFRICAN-AMERICAN MOMENT IN THE
LEGAL ACADEMY
There are moments when obscure events and chance historical ed-
dies come together for an instant, with startling and important results.
Such a moment occurred when thirteen insignificant colonies sent un-
known farmers and businessmen to Philadelphia-delegates who impu-
dently signed a declaration of independence. Ever since that time the
world has had to live with the innocence, arrogance, and the efforts of
those people. Fannie Lou Hamer's refusal on behalf of the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party to take token black seats at the Democratic
National Convention in 1964, even though all the black people of Missis-
sippi were tired and needed rest, is another of those occasions. For the
legal academy, this is such a moment in history, an African-American
Moment, when different and blacker voices will speak new words and
remake old legal doctrines.2 Black scholars will demand justice with
1. BROTHER FROM ANOTHER PLANET (John Sayles, A-Train Films 1983) (The tale of a black
mute alien from another planet who lands on Ellis Island and tries to survive in New York City. He
discovers love and the power of brotherhood and observes the condition of black people in a racist
society.). This Article is about opening a dialogue between white and black colleagues. The Pro-
logue suggests some of the difficulties that need to be avoided if such a dialogue is to take place. In
contrast, the Epilogue is an example of a positive form of dialogue.
2. I should describe at the beginning of this Article the relationship between Black Legal
Scholarship and Critical Race Theory. A small but growing number of scholars of color have started
to criticize and develop a perspective on the law that is conscious of racial and gender concerns. I
have learned much from scholars of color in this group. To name just a few people from whom I
have learned: Derrick Bell, John Calmore, Paulette Caldwell, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Harlon Dalton,
Peggy Davis, Richard Delgado, Linda Greene, Neil Gotanda, Lani Guinier, Angela Harris, Charles
Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, john powell, Gerald Torres, Patricia Williams, and Robert Williams. I
consciously chose the notion of "Black Legal Scholarship" to focus on issues of being black in Amer-
ican law and society that are different from, if often similar to, the problems that are faced by other
people of color in society and sometimes by women. I did not mean to preclude the discussion of
nonblack people of color or to presume to claim some priority of status in the world of color for
black people, but I did mean to emphasize-in a way that many often do not-that being black is
different from other ways of being in our society and legal system. I hope this Article will spur the
growth and development of scholarship of color, of critical race theory in its broadest terms, and any
and all attempts to look at race and color in their broadest senses by white scholars and scholars of
color. I believe there are at least some important lessons to be learned from doing so by not simply
treating all people of color the same. In particular, the notion of "other" embedded in the concept of
the "minority" permits the definition of nonwhite in white terms. It is this account of "other" that I
reject by claiming to be black. See ANTHONY BARTHELEMY, BLACK FACE, MALIGNED RACE
(1987) (noting that the notion of color has a broad meaning in English literary settings; for example,
the term "moor" is used in English literature to mean anyone who was not Christian, European, or
Jewish and includes Asians, Native Americans, Africans, Arabs, and all muslims-accordingly a
moor is "not a European Christian." Id. at 7, 10-17).
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equality and nonblack scholars will understand. Such moments, whether
mere seconds or whole decades, sweep away the unprepared and the re-
calcitrant with the necessity of the instant. Those in the legal academy
who cannot speak the language of understanding will be relegated to the
status of historical lepers alongside of Tory Americans and Old South
Democrats.
Legal scholarship remains one of the last vestiges of white
supremacy in civilized intellectual circles. Literature, art, and occasion-
ally even politics have been changed significantly by legal efforts, even as
law itself has remained indifferent to the import of those changes.
3 Most
legal scholars, judges, and law students do not know that they approach
The second issue is related to the first: whether race is a useful concept in either its broad or
narrow terms-a point made by Professor Barbara Fields in history and in a slightly different way by
my colleague Bill Van Alstyne. Professor Fields has pointed out that at least in the historical setting
race is a construct of historians. She noted that the biological differences between white ethnic
groups are larger than the differences among American blacks and that the genetic basis of racial
groups is largely discredited. She contends that historians have made too much of race in a histori-
cal context:
It is my intention to suggest that Americans, including many historians, tend to accord
race a transhistorical, almost metaphysical, status that removes it from all possibility of
analysis and understanding. Ideologies, including those of race, can be properly analyzed
only at a safe distance from their terrain. To assume, by intention or default, that race is a
phenomenon outside history is to take up a position within the terrain of racialist ideology
and to become its unknowing-and therefore noncontesting-victim.
Barbara J. Fields, Ideology and Race in American History, in REGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUC-
TION 144 (J. Morgan Kousser & James McPherson eds. 1982). Certainly we run the risk in legal
scholarship of race of making race transcend law and thereby missing the fact that race is a construct
of society and not a natural phenomenon. However, even if race is just an ideological construct of
society, it is a powerful force-playing as powerful a role as nationality for most residents of North
America. Even if slavery were not a racial phenomenon and not the inevitable result of racial preju-
dice, it became so in this country, and the results on our legal system are profound. In addition, I
would argue that race can be positively claimed as a way of culturally and individually defining
oneself. In that sense race matters not as a western concept of otherness or strangeness but as a
source of Jazz and communal feelings and notions of brotherhood that transcend negative defini-
tions. I would like the Black Legal Scholarship that we do to reclaim, as best we can, those positive
elements of race.
3. See, eg., BLACK AESTHETICS (Pio Zirimu & Andrew Gurr eds. 1973) (literature);
STOKLEY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION
IN AMERICA (1967) (politics); HENRY Louis GATES, JR., FIGURES IN BLACK: WORDS, SIGNS, AND
THE "RACIAL" SELF (1987) (literature); AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTr RUDWICK, BLACK HISTORY
AND THE HISTORICAL PROFESSION, 1915-1980, at 239-308 (1986) (history); EARL E. THORPE,
BLACK HISTORIANS: A CRITIQUE (1971) (history). Gunnar Myrdal stated this argument quite suc-
cinctly in talking about the legal system and the South:
Practically all public officials in the South are whites. The principle is upheld that Negroes
should not be given positions of public authority even on a low level ....
In the policeman's relation to the Negro population in the South, there are several
singularities to be observed, all of which have to be explained in the historical setting
presented above. One is that he stands not only for civic order as defined in formal laws
and regulations, but also for "white supremacy" and the whole set of social customs associ-
ated with this concept. In the traditions of the region a break of the caste rules against one
white person is conceived of as an aggression against white society and ... that even minor
transgressions of caste etiquette should be punished, and the policeman is delegated to
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the question of law from a perspective that excludes black concerns.
Most believe that American law, as derived from the Constitution and
incorporated in the Declaration of Independence, deserves the respect,
reverence and support of all Americans-particularly black Americans-
who have benefited so directly from the beneficence of the current legal
system.4 This beneficence, however, has been true more in theory than in
carry out this function. Because of this sanction from the police, the caste order of the
South, and even the local variations of social custom, become extensions of the law.
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AMERICAN DILEMMA 535 (1962) (footnote omitted). The system Myrdal de-
scribed has changed in the South to a certain degree. However, he underestimates the extent to
which caste exists in both the North and the South, and the fact that changes in the legal system
have not accommodated themselves to the race-based caste system that exists in America. One can
no longer contend that only whites are police officers, but blacks are still vastly underrepresented in
the police forces of America in both the North and the South. For a discussion of McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), see infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text. Note that it is still
possible for counsel to withhold testimony of a black lawyer for fear that his assistance might have
an "ill effect" on the trial of a white defendant. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 814-16 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. One of the best examples of this strong current in judicial opinions is Justice Bradley's
opinion in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which he concluded that the Civil Rights
Acts cannot extend to the private activities of citizens, and thus helped to ensure that there would be
no governmental protection for black civil rights until the second half of the 20th century. Justice
Bradley argued that,
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken
off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of
his elevation when he takes the rank of mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of
the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary
modes by which other men's rights are protected.
Id. at 25. A recent statement of this view was made by Dean Eugene V. Rostow in his testimony in
support of the nomination of Judge Robert Bork. Dean Rostow testified,
No one could have heard or read the testimony of some of the witnesses-Barbara Jordan,
for example, or William Coleman-without being moved and troubled. They are con-
cerned about the possibility immense progress in our constitutional law of personal liberty
accomplished by the leadership of the Supreme Court since the time of Chief Justice
Hughes would be placed in jeopardy by the appointment of Judge Bork. Such a possibility
would indeed be a matter for universal alarm. But their fear is groundless.
Similar fears were widely held about the revolutionary changes in constitutional law
which were expected during Chief Justice Burger's term of office. That revolution did not
take place then, and it will not take place now. The development of law has immense
momentum. It grows according to its own rules, case by case, generation after generation.
It will prevail once again. The libertarian tradition of American society reinforced by its
law does not belong to either political party or to any one intellectual or ideological sect. It
is a national creation and a national possession made by thousands of men and women over
the years, Republicans, Democrats, Federalists and Whigs alike; Liberals, Conservatives,
and Radicals; judges, citizens, writers, political leaders.
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice to the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings on the Confirmation of Judge Robert Bork before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1822 (1987). Dean Rostow suggested the existence of a neutral constitutional
machine and did not include blacks among the creators of this constitutional edifice precisely be-
cause he believes that race, separate from the fact of being a conservative or liberal, or citizen or
judge, cannot be relevant to American law. See also NATHAN GLAZER, ETHNIC DILEMMAS 1964-
1982, at 159-232 (1983) (affirmative action and the voting rights acts benefited black people).
Charles Murray argued that affirmative action has encouraged employers to hire highly educated
blacks, but does not force employers to the provide on-the-job training that leads to wage growth for
white workers. Murray suggested that blacks are given opportunities that, because of their age and
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practice.5 In fact, the American legal system's treatment of African
Americans is a strange amalgam. Although it began by providing for
extensive intrusion by the state into theprivate affairs of individual slave-
holders by prescribing in great detail exactly what was required of indi-
vidual slaves and their masters, 6 the system eventually evolved into one
that limited, for almost one hundred years, the ability of the state to
protect the interests of the descendants of these black slaves.7 The ability
experience, they do not deserve, and that they do not turn that opportunity into the appropriate
learning situations. Murray did not explain how or why black workers or white employers should
react this way. In particular, given the strong history of racism and sexism in the job market, why
did white workers not adopt a similar strategy of laziness and sloth that some now attribute to blacks
given this opportunity? Murray instead portrayed the black experience as unusual, and the black
participants in some labor markets as interlopers who will not know how to respond to market
opportunities. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 89-92 (1984).
5. See Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1938 (1987) (stating
that Elman's account of the Supreme Court's invalidation of segregation is unreliable and "bad
reminiscence"); Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case
of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986) [hereinafter R. Kennedy, The Tradition of
Celebration].
6. See, eg., WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 103-10 (1968). Alan Watson described the differences between English
and Roman law in the following fashion:
English slave law possesses a public dimension in a way that is in sharp contrast with
Roman law. Apart from "traditional" criminal law, the state and the other citizens at
Rome were not much involved with the slave and the owner. For example, no one could
interfere with a slave except at the master's instigation. If the slave ran away, his capture
was the master's business. No citizen group was organized to find the runaway. On recap-
ture, it was the master's business to decide whether and how severely the slave was to be
punished. It was up to the master to decide what clothing the slave wore, how he was to be
educated, the training he was to receive, and the work he was to do. The slave could make
contracts with the master's permission, could live wherever the master wished, could in-
dulge in whatever activities (which were otherwise lawful) that the master allowed. In
contrast, in English America one might almost say that a slave belonged to every citizen-
at least he was subordinate to every white. Thus a slave off a plantation could be stopped
by any white and questioned on his activities. Citizens were organized by law in patrols to
recapture runaways. Penalties were laid down for each offense of running away; if within a
certain time the master did not inflict them the state would. The government declared that
only appropriate clothing was to be worn, and it might even determine what clothing was
appropriate. The state intervened in the education of slaves even to the extent of prohibit-
ing teaching them to read or write. Slaves could not buy and sell as their master wished,
they could not live apart from the master whenever he wished, they could not keep horses,
cattle, and pigs; they could not, even if the master would allow it, hire out their time.
These rules did not apply at all times and in all colonies or states, but they do give the
flavor of the general law.
ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS 66 (1989).
7. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 18-2, at 1693-98 (2d ed. 1988). For the most conservative interpretation of this
period, see James McClellan, The Judicialization of the American Republic, in THE JUDGES WAR:
THE SENATE, LEGAL CULTURE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION 61 (Patrick
McGuigan and Jeffrey O'Connell eds. 1987). McClellan wrote,
The crushing military defeat of the Confederacy and the ensuing decade of political radi-
calism also ushered in an amendment that has changed the face of the Constitution and
substantially altered the frame of government. This is the Fourteenth Amendment, which
long ago outlived its usefulness and now threatens to pull down the remaining pillars of the
original Constitution. During the Reconstruction period, when this Amendment was
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of the American legal system to transform itself so completely in order to
ensure the subordination of African Americans demonstrates that when
the issue is race, all other interests take precedence-at least for most of
the first 175 years of our constitutional history.8
This strange history has produced an even stranger reaction from
both black and other scholars who are interested in bringing the experi-
ence of black Americans into the discussions of judges, law professors,
and students. Until recently, black scholars in legal academia failed to
create a distinct black legal scholarship. In this Article, I begin a three-
part discussion about the development of this black legal scholarship. I
first discuss the history of legal scholarship and blacks, and explain why
black scholarship is only now becoming possible and what that means for
the future of legal scholarship in this decade. Second, I explain how I
think race enters into legal scholarship and discourse, and how the new
black scholarship has raised and should continue to raise this issue. Fi-
nally, I discuss the limits of black legal scholarship.
The question of the proper role for black scholars is a difficult one.
It involves issues of definition and seems to pose what for many black
scholars becomes an almost impossible inquiry to answer-are we black
scholars or scholars who happen to be black? The answer I provide in
this Article is clear, if controversial. We cannot separate our blackness
from the rest of ourselves. We are both black and scholars, and our
blackness influences who we are, what we teach, and how we view the
world. We can and do perform within some forms of traditional legal
scholarship, but there are some assumptions that we cannot make about
the world or how the world functions.9 We bring that notion of who we
forced upon the prostrate South, the Radical Republicans governed this country. Congress
was king, and legislative supremacy was the law of the land. The Enforcement Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a strange and unique provision that promised to subvert the
separation of powers by making Congress the judge of its own powers, was designed to
serve as the vehicle for legislative supremacy. But Congress soon fell prey to internal diffi-
culties and partisan bickering, and by 1875 the Supreme Court had taken full charge of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its proper interpretation.
Id. at 79.
8. There are, of course, some exceptions to this trend. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917) (holding that a municipal ordinance mandating that homeowners could not sell their homes
to members of the minority race violated the fourteenth amendment); see also R. Kennedy, The
Tradition of Celebration, supra note 5.
9. This is true of almost all black academics despite divergent political views. Thomas Sowell,
a conservative black scholar, does not believe that black Americans are intellectually inferior. On
this point, he differs from some of the people who cite to his work with agreement. Compare
Thomas Sowell, Race and LQ. Reconsidered, in AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 203-34 (T. Sowell ed.
1978) (noting that other ethnic groups now thought intellectually gifted, e.g., Poles, Jews and
Italians, were once thought to be intellectually inferior) with ARTHUR JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL
TESTING (1980) (arguing that blacks on average have lower I.Q.'s than whites because of genetic
differences). Of course not all white conservatives subscribe to this view, either.
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are to the discussion, and it does not simply color the discussion; it in-
fuses the discussion with our being. 10
II. FROM MAMMIES TO MILITANTS: THE ROLE OF BLACK
SCHOLARS IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY
A. Introduction
All black law professors face a common problem. We are asked to
play a role that is assigned to us because of our race, and we then are
asked to remove our blackness when we play the role. This role is to be
black and to be a law professor without retaining any visible signs of our
black experience. Our colleagues would like us to take care of black stu-
dents, mother white students, and perform numerous tasks associated
with being professors.I1 Not all of us are ready or able to play all of the
roles that our status as black representatives in a largely white profession
thrust on us. We not only rebel, we try to reshape the role. With respect
to our scholarship, we bring the voice of our own experience to the writ-
ing and teaching that we perform. Our experiences simultaneously vary
from and are similar to the experiences of other black Americans. In
addition, we are Americans, for the most part, born and educated, and
certainly experienced, in the American society. We sometimes see the
world exactly as other Americans see it and sometimes not, but we al-
ways bring that dual experience that is both similar to and different from
the experience of white law professors to the jobs we perform as
professors.
Despite these differences and similarities, we are asked to be respon-
sible for responding to racial problems. When black students are
harassed by representatives of large, mostly white law firms, we cannot
escape being asked questions about what should be done. This occurs
not only because we care about the answers our schools make to such
accusations, but also because our response is a check on the racism that
we silently know exists in American society and certainly in the legal
world. Similarly, few of us have escaped or can hope to escape the ques-
tion, "What do you think of Randy Kennedy's article?"' 2 An even
10. There is a corollary to this point that applies with equal force to nonblack scholars, but I
return to that point at the very end of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 186-91.
11. See Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still White
Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986); Roy Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors
Avoid the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 419 (1986).
12. Randall Kennedy, a black professor at Harvard Law School, argues that minority scholars
have not proven that their views on civil rights were ignored by white scholars, nor have they shown
in a traditional way that there is a racial critique that is unique to minority scholars. In addition, he
claims that minority scholars who complain about diversity have failed to demonstrate that there is a
sufficient pool of minority candidates to be hired at prestigious law schools. See Randall Kennedy,
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smaller number of us are able to escape being told what the questioner
thinks is the correct answer to that question. It is in facing these ques-
tions that a part of the role of being a black law professor is defined.
The role of the black law professor is changing, and this change will
shape how black law professors respond to these and other questions in
the future. This role change is similar to the historical change that black
workers have made over time. The best example of this phenomenon is
the change in the portrayal of the black female domestic in literature and
the movies from being mammies to being militants. 13 This transforma-
tion reflects some real change in black domestics as well as some real
change in the perception of the rest of society.14
In the past, as black scholars we have been limited by our status,
just as our grandmothers, mothers, and sisters were confined to work as
maids and wet nurses. 15 White families sought black women who could
become larger-than-life mother figures, who compromised everything to
be a part of the employers' world and thereby lost touch with black com-
munities.16 Black women who were maids became "mammies" when
they accepted the fate desired by the white households.
Racial Critiques of LegalAcademia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989); see also Colloquy: Response to
Randall Kennedy's "Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, " 103 HARV. L. REV. 1844 (1990); Alex
Johnson, "Racial Critiques of LegalAcademia'" A Reply in Favor of Context, 43 STAN. L. REV. 137
(1990); the debate and discussion associated with the Minority Section of the AALS that took place
in Washington D.C. (Sept. 1989) (Richard Delgado, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Robert Williams, and
Randall Kennedy) (audiotape available from author).
13. See TRUDIER HARRIS, FROM MAMMIES TO MILITANTS: DOMESTICS IN BLACK AMERI-
CAN LITERATURE (1982). Professor Harris looks at the changing role of black women domestics in
American literature and describes the way in which these fictional characters become more faithful
to their own lives over time; see also DONALD BOGLE, ToMs, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMMIES, AND
BUCKS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN FILMS (1973).
14. I choose this example self-consciously to include women as well as men. When I refer to
black people in this Article, I mean both black men and black women with all that such inclusion
entails as fully as it is possible to do so. I am reminded by Paulette Caldwell that there is a patriar-
chal interpretation of the notion of mammies and militants that I do not intend. I mean "militant"
to convey an image of a militant black woman and "mammy" a nonmilitant black woman, and to
have those woman stand for all black people in order not to avoid the role of women in the academy.
15. I believe my family's experience is typical of that of most black people of my generation.
Every woman in my mother's generation at some time worked for a white employer in a household
position. Black women of that era were overwhelmingly involved in household occupations. In my
mother's family, black women started as mothers' helpers-positions that differed from being maids
only in the pay-and at some point in their lives acted as a maid for a white employer. In 1958,
more than 37% of the employed African-American (black and other races) women worked as pri-
vate household workers. See HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS REFERENCE EDITION, Table 19, at
68 (1975). Of course, not all black Americans have this experience. See MICHELLE WALLACE,
INVISIBILITY BLUES 13 (1990) ("My mother was never a domestic nor was any other woman in my
family since slavery (they claim they were too 'proud').").
16. Trudier Harris described them this way:
Maids who are described as being truly southern are, then, those who generally acquiesce
in the paternalistic and place-defined relationship between mistress and maid as it has been
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The image of the mammy has a positive meaning to many whites in
the old South, but no black person today would accept that status-with
its implications of subservience to white interests, ignorance, and lack of
racial pride. Until recently, black scholars were, in many ways, in a posi-
tion similar to that of black women, who were portrayed as mammies by
popular culture, and who toiled in white households in the pre-1960 pe-
riod in great numbers. 17 Both groups were hard workers who had a limit
(at least partially self-imposed) on what they could say to the white co-
habitants of their world. They could not complain about the low pay or
the hard work, or raise questions about the nature of the unwritten rules
of their existence. Black legal academicians did not waste their time rais-
ing questions or providing answers if their colleagues on the faculty or
the judge on the bench would not countenance them. Of course, there
were always militants who cried in the wilderness about black problems,
but they were not heard, were unlikely to be granted tenure, and little
that they said or thought survives as part of the usable past.18
Black scholars knew, in exactly the way the black domestic did, that
certain claims were outside the bounds of discourse. Some black maids
came to believe in and endorse their status in white households, but for
most, the role of mammy in white households was part of the duality of
being black.19 For black legal scholars, as for black domestics, it is diffi-
shaped by the attitudes and traditions of southern society. Whether on northern or south-
ern soil, they generally make few, if any, claims of dignity and self-worth within the estab-
lished employer/employee relationship. They are more likely than the others to be "ideal
servants," the mammy figures traditionally identified with southern plantation households.
These women usually compromise everything of themselves and of their connections to the
black community in order to exist in the white world.
T. HARRIS, supra note 13, at 23.
17. The notion of mammy and militant in this context has the dual advantage of including
women in the discussion and not including notions of absolute subservience that are associated with
other similar male concepts like Uncle Tom.
18. This problem of institutional amnesia still exists; the recent discussion about increasing the
number of black faculty, see Paul Brest, Promoting and Nurturing the Academic Values of Faculty
Diversity, AALS Comm. on Recruitment and Retention of Minority Law Teachers (Jan. 5, 1990), is
uninformed by calls in the past by black faculty for similar efforts. See James Jones, Employment
Discrimination, Minority Faculty and the Predominantly White Law School-Some Observations, 4
BLACK L.J. 488 (1975).
19. James Weldon Johnson describes this phenomenon in his 1912 fictional autobiography:
[T]his is the dwarfing, warping, distorting influence which operates upon each and every
coloured man in the United States. He is forced to take his outlook on all things, not from
the view-point of a citizen, or a man, or even a human being, but from the view-point of a
coloured man. It is wonderful to me that the race has progressed so broadly as it has, since
most of its thought and all of its activity must run through the narrow neck of this one
funnel.
And it is this, too, which makes the coloured people of this country, in reality, a
mystery to the whites. It is a difficult thing for a white man to learn what a coloured man
really thinks; because, generally, with the latter an additional and different light must be
brought to bear on what he thinks.... This gives to every coloured man, in proportion to his
intellectuality, a sort of dual personality; there is one phase of him which is disclosed only in
the freemasonry of his own race. I have often watched with interest and sometimes with
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cult to know when one has become the fictionalized character of the ma-
jority's imagination, rather than a real, if not always militant,
nonfictional reality.
The black domestic in the pre-Brown v. Board of Education 20 South
who asked for too much was likely to have no job and possibly no life.
Black scholars perceive similar restrictions, but have become more mili-
tant in their claims about the value of the black experience-only be-
cause those claims are countenanced by their colleagues. These black
scholars live in an uneasy peace with what their colleagues and judges
hear and what they are willing to say. As black scholars make the transi-
tion from mammies to militants, it is important to understand that the
ability to be a militant is a product of historical opportunities (both socie-
tal permission and community strength), and not simply a matter of per-
sonal perseverance or courage. At the same time, it ought to be obvious
that it is easier to make the transition back from militant to mammy by
acquiescing to the status quo. Today's militant is tomorrow's mammy to
the extent that black scholars do not force legal scholarship and teaching
to face up to the racism that lurks in our society. Such efforts are by
definition awkward and unrewarding. And I should note that being
black obviously does not equal being infallible. Black scholars are going
to make errors and criticize improperly, but they cannot and should not
be complacent about where they have been.
Black legal scholars have faced a history of not being heard, or of
being heard only selectively. Like the mute alien in Brother from Another
Planet, white scholars traditionally have heard black scholars only when
what they have said and claimed were compatible with white concerns.
Black legal scholars must make the transition from producing scholar-
ship exclusively directed toward whites in power to producing scholar-
ship that is inwardly supportive of and directed to themselves, as well as
to the whites and blacks in power.
B. Black Jurisprudence and Black Legal Scholarship: From Mammies
to Militants and Back Again
1. Defining the Contours of Jurisprudence. Webster's Dictionary
defines "jurisprudence" as being "a system or body of law," "the course
of court decisions," or as "the science or philosophy of law."'21 This
amazement even ignorant coloured men under cover of broad grins and minstrel antics
maintain this dualism in the presence of white men.
JAMES WELDON JOHNSON, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN Ex-COLOURED MAN 21-22 (2d ed. 1986)
(emphasis added).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1227 (1981).
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broad definition of jurisprudence, which encompasses two different con-
cepts, obscures the different legacies of this term. I limit my use of the
term "jurisprudence," to a description of the course of court decisions,
and use the term "legal scholarship" to encompass the science or philoso-
phy of law.22 This distinction is crucial to my thesis that blacks have
been somewhat successful in establishing a body of Black Jurisprudence
through litigation and the presence of blacks on the federal bench. I
believe that it is possible to discern a Black Jurisprudence in the opinions
of the blacks who have been appointed to the federal bench in the last
thirty years23 and in the efforts of blacks to change the views of white
participants in the legal process. In contrast, however, blacks have pro-
duced very little in the realm of Black Legal Scholarship that challenges
the underlying principles of a legal system that subordinates the needs of
blacks to the interests of whites.
The primary objective of Black Jurisprudence has been to persuade
the courts that legal rules ought to govern the relationship between
blacks and whites. The history of Black Jurisprudence is the struggle to
enlarge the arena in which legal rules apply. The black originators of the
strategy to eliminate "separate but equal" laws had to use the primacy of
legal rules in American society to persuade the courts that the legal rules
that were applied to blacks were unfair. First, blacks had to prove that
the law applied to them, and then they had to prove that the law ought to
apply to them equally-that when it came to the application of the law,
blacks and whites should be treated the same.
The efforts of blacks to create a jurisprudence have evolved from a
set of assumptions about the role of blacks and the black experience of
the law that are very different from white perspectives. This jurispruden-
tial difference has structured the arguments made by these black lawyers
about the law and the Constitution. However, this Black Jurisprudence
has focused on only one part of the difference between the black and the
white legal experience-the denial of formal equality promised by the
Constitution and denied to African Americans. The demand for equality
22. I have termed a similar distinction in theory the distinction between grand theory and
parochial interest. The effort to find a grand theory is a growing effort in law-an effort to make law
"scientific." Although not new, this effort has become increasingly important. See, e.g., George
Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 437 (1983). In contrast, there is a growing effort to bring the parochial interests of women,
racial minorities, and the poor into the legal discourse. This call to focus on these different concerns
is reminiscent of older ways of legal discourse-a discourse in which theory played a much smaller
role. See also Jerome Culp, Grand Theory and Parochial Interests: Black Perspectives and the Law
(presented at Labor Law Section of AALS, San Francisco, January 5, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript).
23. For an incomplete list of black judges now serving on the federal bench, see ON BEING
BLACK: AN IN-GRoup ANALYSIS 166 (David Pilgrim 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter ON BEING BLACK].
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with whites included a demand that blacks be recognized as the same as
whites-the demand for "colorblindness." The claim that the Constitu-
tion and the American legal system in general is, or ever has been, color-
blind or color neutral never has been attacked by Black Jurisprudence.
This does not mean that adherents of Black Jurisprudence were unaware
of this truth, but rather that it was not, or perhaps more clearly could not
be, expressed.
Black legal scholars-particularly in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s-
were constantly drawn away from developing such a legal scholarship by
the pull to participate in the struggle of black Americans for "equal jus-
tice under the law"-the cry for formal equality. Thurgood Marshall,
Robert Carter, Constance Baker Motley and countless black attorneys in
small towns were involved in the frontline claims for justice within the
white system, according to white rules that hid white superiority under
the claim of color neutrality. This effort to achieve equal justice through
the court system is really a request to those in power, largely white and
male, to respond to black claims of justice. Black scholars had to "know
their place" in order to have their claims heard. Black scholars and law-
yers who participated in the mainstream of the profession supported the
role that this "place" required of black scholars. Black scholars were not
the pure southern mammies of literature, but they were actors con-
strained by the understanding that making militant claims about change
would not be countenanced by judges, white colleagues, or their largely
white students.
Many of the black scholars who were attracted to the academy were
proponents of a Black Jurisprudence; with this orientation, they brought
to legal scholarship the very arguments of "colorblindness" that they
used in litigation.24 This lack of a separate and distinctly black legal
scholarship seems strange given the long history of differential treatment
of blacks in American society. The failure to deal with the entire spec-
trum of differences between blacks and whites has meant that the impact
of the legal system on blacks, particularly the silent impact, has gone
unrecorded in the very legal scholarship directed at explicating this
situation.
2. Why Black Legal Scholarship? The focus on Black Jurispru-
dence has meant that a true Black Legal Scholarship has been woefully
underdeveloped. Black legal scholars initially had to struggle for the vic-
tories in the courtroom under existing law before a distinct vision of the
24. See, e.g., William Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restric-
tive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 203, 237 (1948) (giving as an example of constitutional
colorblindness the majority opinion in that case) [hereinafter Ming, Racial Restrictions].
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law could be created. In creating a consistent perspective that they could
use to litigate successfully in the courts, the black lawyer-proponents of
Black Jurisprudence, both as litigants and as judges, accepted aspects of
the vision propounded by the nonblack majority. Black Legal Scholar-
ship requires the articulation of visions that transcend these majority
perspectives.
The first and most important task of this Article is to convince black
and white readers that there is a Black Jurisprudence and that this juris-
prudence is leading to the development of a Black Legal Scholarship-a
scholarship that ought to be included in the development of legal princi-
ples. White scholars often have ignored or belittled the contributions
and efforts of blacks during the last thirty years.25 More is written about
Earl Warren than about Thurgood Marshall,2 6 and very little attention
has been paid to the large number of able black judges who now inhabit
the federal trial courts and the courts of appeal in both the North and the
South.27 The reason is quite simple: It is difficult for black people to be
heard speaking on anything but race. Even when black scholars and law-
yers are heard, the general public only understands a part of what black
people say. In other words, like the accidental visitors to the Harlem bar
in Brother From Another Planet, white scholars have concluded that they
are having a conversation when they are really engaging in a monologue.
25. See Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REv. 4, 52-54
(1985) [hereinafter Bell, Foreword]; R. Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, supra note 5; see also
Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 561 (1984) (arguing that white scholars should stop writing about minority issues to
leave room for minority voices).
26. This may explain why a random survey of American judges by the National Law Journal
found that only three percent ranked Thurgood Marshall as the most admired Supreme Court jus-
tice-lower than any other justice, including Justice Scalia, who had been on the Court for only one
year at the time of the survey. Only three percent of the sample surveyed were black. Ellen Rosen,
The Nation's Judges: No Unanimous Opinion, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 10, 1987, at S1, S9. This view is
consistent with the description of Justice Marshall in BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 47, 77 (1979). Randall Bland argued that Marshall had a profound impact on the law
primarily as an advocate: "[B]y any reasonable standard of objectivity, a review of the sixty opinions
contributed by Marshall during his first four terms discloses a noticeable lack of judicial scholarship.
In the main, his opinions included many, usually lengthy quotations from cited cases; they presented
precious little original thought or distinguished conceptualizations." RANDALL BLAND, PRIVATE
PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW 174 (1973) (footnotes omitted). This view of Marshall as being unscho-
larly in many ways falls into the typical stereotype of blacks and is part of the effort to ignore
Marshall's accomplishments as a judge and an intellect. But see Symposium: A Tribute to Justice
Thurgood Marshall, HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J., Spring 1989 (examining the role and intellectual
accomplishments of Justice Marshall before and during his tenure on the Supreme Court).
27. See, eg., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977) (a historical account of the progress
of racism and black Americans in the law). Some things have been written about Justice Marshall,
but, given his contribution as litigator and as judge in developing the law, the scholarship has been
extremely limited. See also JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (the development of a group of
white judges interested in equal justice in the South was unlooked for and unexpected).
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It is not that blacks cannot communicate in any form, but like the mute
in that movie, they cannot communicate in a manner that the white par-
ticipants are currently able to appreciate. 28 White liberals say that black
scholarship does not exist outside of the common front that they have
shared with black Americans. The efforts of blacks to free themselves is
considered derivative of the effort of white people to save them. In other
words, the civil rights struggle is seen and understood through the eyes of
the white people who participated in it.29 This way of seeing the civil
rights struggle is less threatening to white interests, and it is consistent
with other historical patterns of dealing with change. In his book, The
Liberal Tradition in America, Professor Louis Hartz notes that Ameri-
cans often believe that they are radical, although they actually suppress
the most important radical elements in the changing nature of the polit-
ical process. 30 This masking of the radical elements has been particularly
prevalent with regard to the issue of race and the law.
Those at the intellectual extremes also have ignored the efforts of
blacks in the legal struggle.31 Radicals would like to redefine the struggle
of blacks in their own terms, i.e., to subsume blacks into a larger model
of class struggle.32 Conservatives are more honest about their views on
28. This is not a new phenomenon. Free blacks before the Civil War created alternative aboli-
tionist organizations and publications because they thought white abolitionists were not listening to
their views. Leonard Sweet writes that
[Miany white[ ] [abolitionists] were both anti-slavery and anti-slaves.... Although aboli-
tionist patterns of action were not fissured neatly along racial lines, black abolitionists up-
held a vision of society ... based not just on the abolition of slavery but on the annihilation
of race prejudice and the affirmation of equal rights and equal justice.
LEONARD I. SWEET, BLACK IMAGES OF AMERICA, 1784-1870, at 140-41 (1976).
29. See R. Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, supra note 5, at 1938. Randall Kennedy argued
that Philip Elman has ignored and belittled the efforts of black lawyers in the campaign to win
Brown, and that Elman's efforts at history have degenerated into self-congratulation. Philip Elman
stated that there is no need to respond to charges that he has belittled black lawyers because "[t]he
answer to that is my entire life." Philip Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949, 1957 (1987).
30. Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 3-32 (1955).
31. See Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the Funda-
mental Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407-13 (1988); Andrew
Haines, The Critical Legal Studies Movement and Racism: Useful Analytics and Guides for Social
Action or an Irrelevant Modern Scepticism and Solipsism?, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 685 (1987).
32. See ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Critical Legal
Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). Blacks are largely ignored by white radicals, except
when they are discussing race. In addition, even when race is mentioned, white radicals often go out
of their way to assign no power to race outside of class and other concerns. See, e.g., MARK KEL-
MAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 247-49 (1987) (analyzing the response of Critical
Legal Studies literature to the use of state force by elites); Frances Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race,
Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (1989). Professor Ansley
argues that there are two different models that describe the way of looking at race and the law: the
race model, which sees racism as a product of the desire by society for white supremacy; and the
class model, which sees racism as a product of class structure and power. However, both models
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race and about the contribution of blacks to legal scholarship. Because
conservatives consider race irrelevant, blacks cannot have any claim on
whites through their scholarship or arguments.
3. The Search for Color Blindness and Black Jurisprudence.
Black Jurisprudence is a product of the efforts of a relatively small group
of mostly black lawyers to achieve legal equality for black Americans. In
partially reaching this goal, the participants argued for a model of equal-
ity that was a product of the dominant view of justice, but, in so arguing,
they ignored other black concerns. This focus on bringing blacks within
the protection of the law was often described in terms of color blindness.
In 1955, Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP, commented on
the then-recent victory in Brown, and described Black Jurisprudence as
"the most vital ingredient in a government of, by and for the people, not
the white people, but all the people."'33
Frederick Douglass, the foremost black spokesperson in the 19th
century, also adopted a Black Jurisprudential perspective. Speaking dur-
ing the Civil War to a convention of Black Americans, Douglass said,
"In this department of human relations, no notice should be taken of the
color of men; but justice, wisdom, and humanity should weigh alone, and
be all-controlling."'34
assume that race is part of some overarching system that is not race dependent. Part of what some
black scholars are saying is that race is more than simply class.
Black radicals may be subject to the same tendency to subsume race within other categories.
William Julius Wilson argues that race has been supplanted by class as the most important factor in
the creation of differences among blacks and whites. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLIN-
ING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1980).
33. Roy Wilkins, The Conspiracy to Deny Equality, in NEGRO PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 255, 262 (Francis Broderick & August Meier eds. 1965). He also added,
Slowly in this fifty-eight years, we have lifted ourselves by our own bootstraps. Step by
halting step, we have beaten our way back. It has been a long and tortuous road since the
Dred Scott decision of 1857 which branded us as non-citizens and which, by the Plessy
decision, gave the states and the nation as a whole the green light to treat us as they
pleased.... Thurgood Marshall, our general counsel, has outlined how we will use the
courts. We shall continue to use education and persuasion and moral pressure. Heartened
by the support of millions of our white fellow citizens in all sections of the country, we
welcome their participation in the crusade which is one not alone for us, but for our nation
as a whole. And we shall use all the political power we can muster.
Id. at 257-62 (emphasis added).
34. Frederick Douglass, The Cause of the Negro People (address of the Colored National Con-
vention to the People of the United States, October 4-7, 1864), reprinted in 3 THE LIFE AND WRrr-
INGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (Philip Foner ed. 1952). Douglass added,
We believe that the highest welfare of this great country will be found in erasing from its
statute-books all enactments discriminating in favor or against any class of its people, and
by establishing one law for the white and colored people alike. Whatever prejudice and
taste may be innocently allowed to do or to dictate in social and domestic relations, it is
plain, that in the matter of government, the object of which is the protection and security
of human rights, prejudice should be allowed no voice whatever.
Id. at 418.
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Similar themes of Black Jurisprudence echoed through much of the
traditional civil rights movement. This theme is especially apparent in
the speeches of Martin Luther King, 35 but it is also visible in the work of
other blacks, even conservative blacks who did not participate in the civil
rights struggle directly. Thomas Sowell, a conservative economist, ex-
pressed this view in these terms:
An attorney and former official of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
inadvertently revealed much of the evolution of that organization
when he noted that by the mid-1960s "the long golden days of the civil
rights movement had begun to wane," that the legal tools which it had
developed "now threatened to collect dust."... In reality, the crusade
for civil rights ended years ago. The scramble for special privilege, for
turf, and for image is what continues on today under that banner and
with that rhetoric.
36
Sowell disagrees with the broad notion expressed by both Douglass and
Wilkins about the scope of Black Jurisprudence, but his statement makes
clear that he agrees with the notion of equal rights and equal privileges; it
is when black activists call for "special" rights that Sowell disagrees with
the thrust of black demands.
As described by Roy Wilkins, Frederick Douglass, and Thomas
Sowell, Black Jurisprudence consists of two elements. It demands that
legal equality, as defined by blacks, be given to black citizens, and it re-
quires that the law respond to black pleas for participation in the struggle
to define and achieve this equality and notion of justice.
This view did not always provide even the barest sense of equality
for blacks.37 Black groups seeking equality in the late part of the 19th
and the early part of the 20th century accommodated themselves to the
hostility of whites by introducing separate car legislation in several
states.3s Similarly, blacks who wanted jobs or to have their children edu-
cated in public schools preferred segregated schools to no schools or jobs
35. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1964); Randall Kennedy, Martin
Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999
(1989) [hereinafter R. Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution].
36. THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 117 (1984) (footnotes omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
37. This does not mean that this approach taken by black lawyers was not different from the
arguments that white lawyers would have made, nor that in its time the notion that blacks had a
right to claim rights was not in and of itself a revolutionary notion. For a discussion of how black
lawyers like Charles Houston and William Hastie became involved in the legal battle for equality, see
AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, ALONG THE COLOR LINE: EXPLORATIONS IN THE BLACK
EXPERIENCE 128-73 (1976) [hereinafter A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, ALONG THE COLOR LINE].
Meier and Rudwick discuss the difficulty faced by black lawyers, particularly in the South, of being
heard and the argument consistently made by Houston as a black dean of a black law school that
blacks must be involved in the defense of black rights.
38. CHARLES LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE 13 (1987) (describing how a black legislator sought
to have the Virginia legislature establish a committee to seek separate cars for blacks). Lofgren also
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at all.39 When it was possible, many black leaders called for equal oppor-
tunities on a nonsegregated basis.40 This was particularly true of calls for
job equality during times of high labor demand.
The case that best summarizes Black Jurisprudence is, of course,
Brown v. Board of Education. 41 Almost twenty years of planning by a
group predominately comprised of black lawyers and headed by
Thurgood Marshall and Charles Houston produced the legal argument
that led to success in Brown.42 In Brown, the NAACP argued that segre-
gation was inherently unequal.43 But Black Jurisprudence was already
recognizable in the best known precursor to Brown, Plessy v. Ferguson.4
In Plessy, the Supreme Court held that state-mandated equal but sepa-
rate accommodations on an interstate rail line did not violate the consti-
tutional requirement of equal protection incorporated in the fourteenth
amendment or the prohibitions against slavery in the thirteenth
amendment.
Plessy, like Brown, was the product of an extensive campaign by a
black group to eliminate the oppression associated with segregation legis-
lation in Louisiana. The Louisiana Separate Car Act recently had been
passed over the vigorous opposition of black legislators.4 5 Homer Plessy
notes that black Congressman Robert Smalls of South Carolina did not object to blacks having
"separate but equal" accommodations. Id. at 15.
39. See HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BuT EQUAL: A CRITICAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND MINORI-
TIES AND AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCIETY 12-17 (1987). According to Cruse, blacks would have sup-
ported the Blair Bill, which would have provided for extensive investment in public education in the
South, even though the bill called for segregated schools. Cruse argues that the black masses were
not committed to integration, but this argument tends to ignore the problem that blacks often had to
take what was given. Also, it is clear that much of the action by black groups from the 1840s
forward was a demand for an end to segregation in public accommodations and schools. See, e.g.,
Louis Ruchames, Jim Crow Railroads in Massachusetts, in BLACKS IN WHITE AMERICA BEFORE
1865, at 394 (Robert Haynes ed. 1972) (blacks opposed segregation in antebellum North); C. LOF-
GREN, supra note 38, at 28-51.
40. See, ag, ROGER FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1862-77, at 61-87
(1974) (blacks fought to eliminate segregation on public trolleys after the Civil War). Post-Civil War
black-dominated constitutional conventions (Black and Tan conventions) adopted public accommo-
dation provisions that eliminated segregation in much of public life. See id. at 88 (discussion of
provisions in Louisiana); see also PEGGY LAMSON, THE GLORIOUS FAILURE 73-74 (1973) (public
accommodation bill adopted by the South Carolina legislature).
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. Mark Tushnet has argued that the strategy of the NAACP was much less planned than
suggested by its portrayal in Richard Kluger's book SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 27. See MARK
TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at
144-48, 159-66 (1987). This criticism seems misguided. Most observers agree, however, that the
desegregation movement was held together by the position of the NAACP efforts in the legal arena.
43. See Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4, and for the Respondents in No. 10 on Reargu-
ment, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
45. C. LOFGREN, supra note 38, at 28.
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was picked to represent the challenge to the law because he was one-
eighth black and his black ancestry was not discernable in his appear-
ance. Plessy's argument was that the classification of him as black was
arbitrary and that the exceptions to the Louisiana statute arbitrarily lim-
ited the scope of the situations in which blacks could travel with whites.
Under the Louisiana statute, a black man-as defined by the railroad
conductor-could not ride with his white wife, nor could a white mother
ride with her children if the children were defined by the railroad con-
ductor as black. Justice John Marshall Harlan argued that this did not
even permit the black nurse who was accompanying a white adult to
faithfully carry out her duty.46
The Louisiana statute was written in a completely color neutral
manner. From the perspective of the black citizens of Louisiana, the
problem with the statute was not its failure to be color neutral, but its
view of the world from a white perspective. The statute, magnificent in
its color neutrality, mandated separate accommodations, and interfered
with the ability of black Americans to enjoy their citizenship by implic-
itly branding them as inferior. The statute permitted the railroad con-
ductor to decide the color of the passengers and to seek governmental
assistance in enforcing the statute. This statute also gave the conductor
the right to abrogate the common law duty to carry a passenger who
failed to adhere to these legislative regulations. This provision gave the
white citizens the power to define who was black and then assign the
rights that were applicable to that designation.
The American Citizen's Equal Rights Association, a group that pro-
moted the challenge in Plessy, consciously attempted to attack this per-
spective by having a series of octoroons arrested for violations of the
Louisiana Separate Car Act.47 The eight-man majority in Plessy was not
able to see the statute as a license to define who was black because the
Court defined the issue as whether Louisiana had the ability to classify
people and then to apply distinctions to them. The Plessy majority be-
lieved that the stigmatizing impact of this equal-but-separate legislation
was in the mind of black people. This meant that race, like the law, was
viewed through white eyes. Other statutes imposing a white perspective
on black citizens also let the ethnocentrism of white society ooze into
statutory provisions; for example, by permitting black nurses to accom-
pany white travelers, but not allowing white nurses with black travelers.
The movement to achieve equality for blacks accepted the notion of
some black legislators who urged the adoption of separate car legislation
46. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
47. See C. LOFGREN, supra note 38, at 28-60.
[Vol. 1991:39
Vol. 1991:39] TOWARD A BLACK LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 57
in order to achieve improvements in service for blacks who were being
mistreated on the existing integrated lines.48 Blacks who adopted this
view, which was later to became Black Jurisprudence, were trapped in
trying to alter the political and economic rights available to black Ameri-
cans within the framework that created legal apartheid and viewed the
law only from a white perspective. The role of Black Legal Scholarship
is to begin to unmask the prejudice in this "color neutrality" and demand
recognition of the black perspective-to define black Americans indepen-
dently of white perspectives.
In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled that separate but equal was inher-
ently unconstitutional with respect to public schools. The outcome in
Brown required the right Supreme Court, the right issue, and the right
time. It also required the re-education of the white judges who were sub-
ject to their own prejudices about black people. When Brown was de-
cided, all the justices had been born in a century in which black people
were slaves and most (if not all) of the justices had not escaped from the
notion that black people were inferior beings. If the Court had been
polled in 1954 on whether blacks and whites were equal in ability or had
a right to real equality of opportunity, there would not have been a clear
majority on the Court for either proposition.49 And when law professors
such as Herbert Wechsler claimed that there was no neutral principle of
constitutional adjudication with which to explain Brown, they were rely-
ing on a white perspective. 50 From a white perspective, it is unclear what
is wrong with separate but equal, but when one takes a black perspective,
48. Id. at 13.
49. See R. KLUGER, supra note 27. I am not arguing that Brown was unimportant; it clearly
helped to spur the efforts of civil rights activists, and it changed the legal environment substantially,
even if not immediately. See, eg., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS, 1954-63 (1988) [hereinafter T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS]. But one could
argue that even the most liberal justices failed to live up to their own notions of equality and diver-
sity. For example, Randall Kennedy argues that Justice Brennan hired his first black law clerk for
the 1990-91 Term, but then retired from the Supreme Court and thus never actually employed a
black law clerk. See Randall Kennedy, Justice Brennan: Why No Black Law Clerks?, 3 RECON-
STRUCTION 51 (1991).
50. See Herbert Weehsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. Rv.
1, 34 (1959) (claiming that there is no neutral principle which can justify Brown). Note how Wechs-
ler casts this question in terms of a white perspective:
For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by state-enforced segregation is not
one of discrimination at all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely else-
where, in the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same
way on any groups or races that may be involved. I think, and I hope not without founda-
tion, that the Southern white also pays heavily for segregation, not only in the sense of guilt
that he must carry but also in the benefits he is denied....
But if the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an associ-
ation upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.... Given a situation where the
state must practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who
wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for
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it is easy to see why Plessy was wrong and why Brown was constitution-
ally right. From this viewpoint, the aim of the whites who adopted seg-
regation as a mode of social oppression is quite clear-blacks were
oppressed precisely because the white majority believed that race mat-
tered and that society should give the white majority support for these
claims. Black Jurisprudence understood this oppression, but it remained
largely unexpressed in the arguments made to state and federal courts.
Underlying the claim of Black Jurisprudence is a belief in a black per-
spective, but this claim is largely hidden behind color neutral arguments.
The claim of the proponents of a Black Jurisprudence that race mat-
ters is always couched in neutral terms precisely because they otherwise
would not be heard. When all that judges can hear is the clarion call of
neutrality, any note of difference or exception falls on deaf ears. Thus,
Black Legal Scholarship had to wait for a different time and audience.
4. Being a Neutral Judge: An Example of the Limits of Black Ju-
risprudence. The experience of Judge U.W. Clemon provides an excel-
lent illustration of the dilemma faced by black participants in the legal
process in the world of Black Jurisprudence. Judge Clemon, a black law-
yer appointed by President Carter to the federal district court bench, had
holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?... I
confess that I have not yet written the opinion.
Id. Wechsler cannot see the issue from the perspective of disenfranchised, powerless, and racially-
subordinated black people of the South, and-we were to learn-of the North. For a more thought-
ful discussion that does ask how black people view this question, see Charles Black, The Lawfulness
of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960). Black said,
Then does segregation offend against equality? Equality, like all general concepts, has mar-
ginal areas where philosophic difficulties are encountered. But if a whole race of people
finds itself confined within a system which is set up and continued for the very purpose of
keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is then solemnly propounded whether
such a race is being treated "equally," I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign
prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter. The only question remaining (after we get
our laughter under control) is whether the segregation system answers to this description.
Here I must confess to a tendency to start laughing all over again. I was raised in the
South, in a Texas city where the pattern of segregation was firmly fixed. I am sure it never
occurred to anyone, white or colored, to question its meaning. The fiction of "equality" is
just about on a level with the fiction of "finding" in the action of trover. I think few candid
southerners deny this. Northern people may be misled by the entirely sincere protestations
of many southerners that segregation is better for the Negroes, is not intended to hurt
them. But I think a little probing would demonstrate that what is meant is that it is better
for the Negroes to accept a position of inferiority, at least for the indefinite future....
Segregation in the South comes down in apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred
Scott case. The South fought to keep slavery, and lost. Then it tried the Black codes, and
lost. Then it looked around for something else and found segregation.
Id. at 424. Professor Black does ask the Court to view the question of segregation from the black
perspective, but note how he uses the term "southerners" to refer to white southerners. In the end,
for Professor Black and for the others who have written on this issue, the question is what did the
"white" majority believe. By saying this, I am not questioning Professor Black's commitment to
racial justice. He and Professor Wechsler are and were active participants in the struggle for equal-
ity for blacks in this country, but I would like to suggest that even the very best may sometimes see
the world through lenses that are distorted by the racial experiences they bring to the inquiry.
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been a state senator and civil rights activist. In a recent class action dis-
crimination suit, United States v. Alabama, 51 Judge Clemon ruled against
the state of Alabama. He found that the Alabama schools were segre-
gated by law and custom because of the continuance of a history of dis-
crimination. Judge Clemon's opinion, far-reaching and extensive,
included an order for Alabama to submit a remedial plan.52 On motion
by defendants, a stay was issued on February 14, 1986.53 Alabama, re-
sponding to this judicial command to remove discrimination with the
alacrity that is its hallmark,54 successfully convinced the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals to vacate the decision made by Judge Clemon be-
cause of his refusal to recuse himself.
Like the other practitioners of Black Jurisprudence, Judge Clemon
had been an active member of his community during the twenty years
before his appointment to the bench. The Eleventh Circuit correctly
noted that Judge Clemon need not recuse himself because he had chil-
dren who could attend the Alabama schools and therefore would be af-
fected by his ruling, but the Court of Appeals concluded that Judge
Clemon's participation in a small but related part of an anti-discrimina-
tion suit in Alabama several years earlier and his activities as a state
senator in opposing the appointment of some of these parties to the
Board of Trustees, violated the requirement that every effort be made to
"guarantee to the defendant ... a totally fair and impartial tribunal...
[free] from any hint or appearance of bias."1
55
51. 623 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ala. 1985), rev'd, 828 F.2d 1532 (llth Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 487
U.S. 1210 (1988).
52. Id. at 1173.
53. United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d. 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1987).
54. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). The Court noted that,
On February 10, 1984, less than two months from today, twelve years will have passed
since this court condemned the racially discriminatory policies and practices of the Ala-
bama Department of Public Safety. Nevertheless, the effects of these policies and practices
remain pervasive and conspicuous at all ranks above the entry-level position. Of the 6
majors, there is still not one black Of the 25 captains, there is still not one black. Of the 35
lieutenants, there is still not one black. Of the 65 sergeants, there is still not one black. Of
the 66 corporals, only four are black. Thus, the department still operates an upper rank
structure in which almost every trooper obtained his position through procedures that to-
tally excluded black persons. Moreover, the department is still without acceptable proce-
dures for advancement of black troopers into this structure, and it does not appear that any
procedures will be in place within the near future. The preceding scenario is intolerable
and must not continue. The time has now arrived for the department to take affirmative
and substantial steps to open the upper ranks to black troopers.
Id. at 162-63 (quoting Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (M.D. Ala. 1983)).
55. 828 F.2d at 1539 (quoting United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 107, 109
(5th Cir. 1974)). The Court went on to cite 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1942, as amended in 1974 and 1978):
[a]ny ... judge.., shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
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From the perspective of colorblindness adopted by Black Jurispru-
dence, Judge Clemon should have recused himself. He had played a tan-
gential role in proceedings that touched on the matter now before the
court, an involvement that threatened to undermine the defendants' enti-
tlement to a fair and impartial trial. There are many other judges with-
out such a taint who could have provided the independence that was
lacking in Judge Clemon. The problem with this perspective is that it
adopts the white majority's view in Alabama. There are few black law-
yers in Alabama who did not participate in the civil rights struggle-or
at least none whom blacks would like to see appointed to the federal
bench. After all, Alabama has gone through one of the greatest political,
social, and legal changes that has ever occurred with respect to race. A
black lawyer with the skill to sit on the federal bench who did not partici-
pate in this struggle cannot bring the black perspective to the bench.
It is a special kind of paternalism that finds that Judge Clemon must
recuse himself from this case for a white judge who also must have par-
ticipated in the struggle, most probably on the side opposite the interests
of black people. Everyone in Alabama has been colored by the immen-
sity of the changes that have taken place. However, under the perspec-
tive taken by the Eleventh Circuit, only black judges will be forced to
recuse themselves. There is no white lawyer in Alabama who is old
enough to sit on the Alabama district court and who did not have to
confront the issue of race in his practice. The equivalent, from the per-
spective of the white majority, would have been to exclude all former
Confederates from ruling on black issues after the Civil War.
The Circuit panel understood that there was a problem, and it was
troubled by the need to have black lawyers recuse themselves because of
their blackness, but they were unable to see the problem as one of race.
The per curiam decision noted,
To disqualify minority judges from major civil rights litigation solely
because of their minority status is intolerable. This Court cannot and
will not countenance such a result. The recusal statutes do not counte-
nance such a double standard for minority judges. 56
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowl-
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a
lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a
lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity partici-
pated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed
an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
Id. at 1539 n.21 (emphasis added).
56. United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d at 1542 (emphasis added).
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Unfortunately, they have accomplished exactly what they opposed by en-
forcing a "neutral" standard that is not neutral with respect to black
judges. White judges who are known to be extremely insensitive to black
concerns will continue to preside in cases; only blacks will be removed by
the court that read this rule in such a narrow manner. The Eleventh
Circuit, therefore, has sanctioned the right of these white defendants to
have a white judge decide their case. Black plaintiffs do not possess the
same right to have black judges preside over their cases. Elemental fair-
ness requires that whites not be able to accomplish injustice in the name
of neutral principles. The recusal statute as interpreted incorporates the
right of white defendants to eliminate black judges in a wide variety of
class action and class-based situations. Blacks have struggled too hard to
alter the complexion of the bench for the result to be that they can never
judge cases involving racial discrimination.
In recusing himself in this case on remand, Judge Clemon stated the
problem clearly. He noted that Judge Vance,5 7 a former Chair of the
Democratic Party of Alabama and the senior judge on the panel that
ordered Judge Clemon to recuse himself, had failed to recuse himself in a
case involving crossover voting in the Democratic primary in Alabama
on the grounds that "it [is of] ... great importance that case assignment
be made randomly, without influence or manipulation by any party or
judge."58 He also noted that the United States v. Alabama per curiam
opinion,
like the proverbial emperor, has no clothes. While I recognize the
existence of the double standard, I am not resigned to it. The prudent
course may well have been to stand mute in the face of the Knight
opinion, but if I did so, the rocks would cry out.
Like every other judge, I have brought to the bench my race, my
background and my experiences. I view them as assets rather than
57. Judge Vance's tragic death is now attributed to Walter Leroy Moody, Jr., a self-employed
literary agent. Mr. Moody's indictment contends that he killed Judge Vance and civil rights lawyer
Robert Robinson because of concern about a suit pending before the district court in the Eleventh
Circuit and because of racial bias. It is alleged that Moody was concerned about a school desegrega-
tion case that Judge Vance tried and the civil rights work of Robert Robinson.
In a strange twist of fate, Mr. Moody's first lawyer contended that all federal judges had to
recuse themselves from this case because the indictment alleged that Moody was waging war on the
federal judiciary. This motion has been withdrawn by subsequent counsel. In December of 1990,
Mr. Moody was convicted by a federal jury of independent counts of bribery, obstruction of justice,
and witness tampering in his 1972 federal bomb possession conviction. He is subject to up to 69
years in prison for those counts and up to six life terms for the counts associated with the most
recent threats and bombs. See Jane Okrasinski, Who Tries a Colleagues Killer; Alleged Mail-Bomber
Wants All Judges Recused, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 26, 1990, at 10; Ronald J. Ostrow, Man Held In
Mail-Bomb Murders Los Angeles Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at 1, col. 2; Stephanie Saul, An Arrest in
Fatal Mail-Bombs, NEWSDAY, Nov. 8, 1990, at 7.
58. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 70-251-S, at 9 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (quoting Curry v.
Baker, No. 86-7639 (1lth Cir., Sept. 24, 1986) (Vance, J., mem.)).
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handicaps. I will not voluntarily remove myself, because of my race,
from randomly assigned cases involving conflicts between black and
white citizens, or traditionally black and traditionally white institu-
tions of the State of Alabama.5 9
My nonblack colleagues cannot understand Judge Clemon's argument.
They simply do not see the difficulty associated with this concern. They
do not see that Black Jurisprudence continues to require that black
Americans conform to white perspectives.
In sum, the black arguments that led to the success in Brown and its
progeny contain a kind of language spoken by black lawyers to white
judges. It is a language, like other black dialects 60 spoken to whites, that
is different from the language spoken at home and understood at home
by other blacks. It is a language that does not articulate many of the
feelings that underlie the view of blacks in the legal process. If black
participants in the legal process are to communicate fully the desires,
fears, and concerns of the black community, then the law must move
beyond the limited language of Black Jurisprudence. The law must begin
to develop a dialect that looks beyond the narrowest, white-majority per-
spective of equality.
C. Black Legal Scholarship and Feminist Scholarship
The fact that the black struggle has produced a Black Jurisprudence
but not, as yet, a Black Legal Scholarship, does not mean that the devel-
opment of the former was a necessary precursor to the latter, or even that
reform necessarily proceeds in that order. In fact, the effect of feminism
on the law has taken precisely the opposite direction. Over the last ten
years, a distinct Feminist Legal Scholarship has developed in American
law schools, 61 but the rise of this sophisticated alternative vision of
American law has to this point not nurtured an equivalent Feminist Ju-
risprudence.62 In this section, I explore the differences between these two
legal phenomena and explain why the longer-lived Black Jurisprudence
has not produced a distinct Black Legal Scholarship-until now.
It is not possible within the context of this Article to deal with all of
the links between Black and Feminist Legal Scholarship, but I want to
note the important differences that explain why women and not blacks
have been successful in developing a perspective on legal scholarship.
59. Id.
60. See JOEY LEE DILLARD, BLACK ENGLISH; ITS HISTORY AND USAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1972).
61. See infra note 80.
62. This does not of course mean that women judges have failed to have an impact on legal
decisions. See infra note 77.
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There are three reasons for these differences in the development of dis-
tinctive legal scholarships and jurisprudence.
First, the experiences of black (male and female) and nonblack fe-
male lawyers have been quite different. Most black lawyers participated
directly or indirectly in the organized legal struggle for black equality.
63
This participation created results for black lawyers that produced a cen-
tralized vision of the law. Black lawyers had to persuade white judges of
the correctness of their view of the Constitution-that blacks needed to
be included in the community of rights that existed for white Americans.
This left the participants of this struggle with a common way of ap-
proaching constitutional and legal questions that was radical, but not
revolutionary."4 Participants implicitly adopted a legal perspective that
ignored black interests: If white judges were to be convinced, they
needed to be convinced from their own viewpoint that the legitimacy of
their existing legal principles required inclusion of blacks. In other
words, blacks were only demanding what whites claimed they believed in
all along-equality under the law.
65
Second, unlike the black struggle for civil rights, the search by wo-
men for justice was not primarily a product of court decisions.66 Women
63. Black lawyers were drawn into these controversies because they often went to law school to
protect blacks from the vagaries of law and because the segregation of white law firms made their
political and economic interests identical to that of the black communities of which they were a part.
For the kinds of claims that were made on black lawyers, see T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS,
supra note 49.
64. See R. KLUGER, supra note 27, at 256-84 (1975) (describing NAACP Legal Defense Fund's
effort to dismantle Jim Crow after World War II). As Randall Kennedy describes the demands by
the Montgomery Bus Boycott, they seemed modest, but were radical in the context of the times and
made a difference. Even these demands were not sufficiently radical to meet the standards of the
NAACP, who wanted an all-out attack on segregation. Kennedy argues that
[i]t does make a difference-a huge difference-that largely because of reforms won by the
Movement, blacks are legally protected in the most significant domains against invidious
racial discrimination.... The law created by the pressure of the Civil Rights Movement
also speaks, has widely been heard, and is still very much alive.
R. Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution, supra note 35, at 1062-63 (1989).
65. See R. BLAND, supra note 26, at 148-53 (1973) (discussing the political factors of the civil
rights movement surrounding the appointment of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court). For a
fairly comprehensive list of appointed black judges, see ON BEING BLACK, supra note 23, at 166-82.
The list of black lawyers who participated in various ways with the civil rights movement include but
is not limited to the following: Robert Carter, Nathaniel Jones, Constance Baker Motley, Aubrey
Robinson, Jr., U.W. Clemon, Jerome Farris, Cecil Poole, A. Leon Higginbotham, Spottswood W.
Robinson, III, Theodore McMillian, Damon Keith, Joseph Hatchett. This does not mean that all
black lawyers were so engaged or that they had a single perspective.
In addition, the results of the civil rights movement produced a black political force that wanted
to ensure its continued protection by the courts and to vindicate its perspective of the law by seeking
the appointment to the federal bench of black lawyer-participants in the civil rights movement.
66. This is not to say that court decisions played no part in the effort of women to win greater
economic and social equality. Rather, my point is that court decisions were a by-product of a wider
effort for such equality. The women's movement already had accomplished much by the time
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often have lost protection of their interests through court challenges by
men, and the most important rights secured by women have been secured
through the course of political action culminating in constitutional
amendment 67 and statutes, 68 not through the successful reformation of
the common law or constitutional interpretation. Feminist arguments
frequently were not heeded by a judiciary that was largely composed of
white males. When their arguments did command attention, it was often
because men were seeking to limit the scope of legal protection for wo-
men in order to achieve some neutral equality for men.69
The feminist equivalent to Brown v. Board of Education 70 may be
Roe v. Wade, 71 which was decided almost twenty years after Brown.
Brown secured for blacks a set of rights in this country that went far
beyond the schoolhouse, and it helped to feed a growing protest move-
ment and struggle for equality that dated back to the abolitionist era.72
But Roe, on the other hand, was part of a more complicated struggle by
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided. The nineteenth amendment had
given women the right to vote and the states had done very little in opposition to such a fundamental
change in the status of women. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), is the equal protection equivalent
to Brown for women, but it did not have the same impact as did Brown because in 1971 there were
fewer social impairments on white women both in employment and in terms of law compared to
white men, than there were such impairments on the rights of black males compared to white males
in 1954.
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX and the unratified equal rights amendment, H.R. J. Res. 1,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S.J. Res. 10, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. 5529-30
(1983).
68. See The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (prohibiting wage discrimination
based on gender); Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988) (making discrimi-
nation because of gender illegal except for bona fide occupational qualifications). However, note that
the inclusion of sex was first proposed by an opponent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to
demonstrate the ridiculous nature of the protections suggested for blacks. See CHARLES WHALEN &
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT 115-18 (1985).
69. See, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Court invalidated a statute that permitted
women to buy beer at 18 and men at 21 by extending to males between 18 and 21 the right to drink
beer); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (unanimous Court invalidated provisions of
the Social Security Act which provided social security survivor's benefits for widows but excluded
widowers by extending the benefit only to minor children); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (Court struck down statute that required male spouses to prove they receive more than 50%
support from wife in order to obtain military benefits even though female spouses were automatically
eligible). But see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (near-unanimous Court concluded that Utah
statute that obligated parents to provide support for men to 21 and women to 18 was irrational and
remanded issue of appropriate remedy to Utah state courts). See also supra note 66 (discussion of
Reed v. Reed).
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. See ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, To REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CHRIS-
TIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 21-22 (1987); ALDON MORRIS,
THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR
CHANGE 1-16 (1984).
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women for social justice. In short, Roe was not the watershed achieve-
ment and focal point of civil rights for women that Brown was for blacks.
Finally, blacks shaped part of the image of who they are in terms of
how the law treated them. The courts often were ahead of the grassroots
movements in terms of demanding access for blacks to public institu-
tions. In contrast, women's efforts at creating a more gender-fair society
have not been focused on how the law views women.73 Brown signifi-
cantly altered blacks' understanding of where they were and where they
could be in society and provided a bulwark for future struggles. Roe, on
the other hand, did not provide the intellectual support for a feminist
viewpoint that Brown provided for the civil rights agenda. Roe was, and
still is, an important statement of feminist concerns, but feminist descrip-
tions of themselves were not as ineluctably intertwined with Roe as black
demands for equality were fused with the holding in Brown.
Even if Roe is recognized as an important exception to the general
rule that there are very different legal experiences for blacks (men and
women) and nonblack women, it is clear that it is unique, or almost so, in
the history of women and the law. For example, the adoption of the
nineteenth amendment, which enfranchised women, did not produce the
kind of recriminations that were associated with the adoption of the fif-
teenth amendment, which accomplished the same for black men. There
was no widespread attempt by the states to create a grandfather clause
for women after the nineteenth amendment was adopted, and there was
very little litigation associated with its passage.74 Many of the statutory
and constitutional successes of women simply were reaffirmations of the
social trends and the existing fact of women's position in society. This
has not been true for the rights of blacks. The courts have played a sig-
nificant role in the acquisition and removal of rights. Starting with Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 75 proceding through the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy
v. Ferguson, and ending with Brown v. Board of Education and Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 7 6 black rights and judicial interpre-
tation have been inseparably entwined.
73. The long push for the equal rights amendment is an important exception to this argument.
See MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: PoLrrIcS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE AMEND-
ING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986); JANE MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986).
74. The only situation analogous to the "grandfather clause" and other efforts at evading the
fifteenth amendment were a number of cases involving whether the nineteenth amendment required
women's service on juries. See, eg., McDaniels v. Arizona, 62 Ariz. 339, 158 P.2d 151 (1945) (The
nineteenth amendment did not affect the status of women with respect to juries because women
already held the right to vote under the state constitution.). Women became eligible to serve on all
federal juries only by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d
1, 19 n.18, 485 P.2d 529, 540 n.18, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 n.18 (1971).
75. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
76. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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During the last thirty years, women's rights have not been secured
primarily as a product of arguments to the courts. Women's changing
role and increased legal protection were primarily the product of political
movements that altered the landscape and changed the statutes that pro-
vided the rules of the game. This meant that there was no successful
feminist bar from which most female judges could be selected to serve on
the federal bench,77 and although there were calls by women's groups for
more women judges, the beneficiaries of this call were not limited to wo-
men who had actively participated in the political struggle for women's
equality.78 The women appointed to the federal bench came from diverse
77. There are several obvious exceptions. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example, who litigated
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), now sits on the D.C. Circuit. Several other women judges have
also participated in the struggle for sexual equality, but this fight did not dominate the efforts of
members of the female bar in the 1960s and 1970s as it did the black bar in the 1950s and 1960s.
Even the black Republican equivalent of Sandra Day O'Connor, Jewell LaFontant, was a woman
who played a role in the civil rights struggle. Black women lawyers-for example, Constance Baker
Motley-were leaders in the struggle for racial justice, not for feminism. There were few prominent
black lawyers of either sex or party who were nonparticipants in the struggle for racial equality.
Karen Morello notes that the first women on the bench in the 1880s were suffragists, but most, like
Florence Allen (the first women on the Court of Appeals) were lawyers who happened to be women.
This fact shaped some of their views, but they did not seek to create as completely an alternative
vision of society. See KAREN MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMEN IN AMERICA, 1638 To
THE PRESENT 218-47 (1986) (describing the exclusion of women from thejudiciary). Women judges
have a feminist consciousness, i.e., they know they are women, but they have not developed a sepa-
rate feminist judicial perspective of the law, i.e., a Feminist Jurisprudence.
78. The appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor is a good example of this difference. Although
Justice O'Connor had been involved in some political efforts and had supported the equal rights
amendment as a state legislator, she had not been engaged in a concerted effort as a lawyer for equal
justice. Justice O'Connor has staked out some views that are different from the perspective of the
male members of the Supreme Court. For instance, her concurrence in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring), is very different from Justice Scalia's
dissent, which concludes that affirmative action for women and minorities discriminates against
white men like his father who were immigrants to this country and who did not participate in any
racial discrimination. Id. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
One has to read the statement of Justice Scalia in light of the statements of Professor Scalia.
Scalia made the following argument based on his own ancestry:
My father came to this country when he was a teenager. Not only had he never profited
from the sweat of any black man's brow, I don't think he had ever seen a black man. There
are, of course, many white ethnic groups that came to this country in great numbers rela-
tively late in its history-Italians, Jews, Irish, Poles-who not only took no part in, and
derived no profit from, the major historic suppression of the currently acknowledged mi-
nority groups, but were, in fact, themselves the object of discrimination by the dominant
Anglo-Saxon majority.... Yet curiously enough, we find that in the system of restorative
justice established by the [John Minor] Wisdoms and the [Lewis F.] Powells and the [By-
ron R.] Whites [Anglo-Saxon white judges], it is precisely these groups that do most of the
restoring. It is they who, to a disproportionate degree, are the competitors with the urban
blacks and Hispanics for jobs, housing, education-all those things that enable one to
scramble to the top of the social heap where one can speak eloquently (and quite safely) of
restorative justice.
I am entirely in favor of according the poor inner-city child, who happens to be
black, advantages and preferences not given to my own children because they don't need
them. But I am not willing to prefer the son of a prosperous and well-educated black
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backgrounds, and the feminist jurisprudential vision that animates their
activity as judges is more diffuse than for black Americans.79 Feminist
Legal Scholarship was not limited by a fidelity to a preexisting set of legal
assumptions upon which the movement had been based. The lack of
these assumptions permitted feminist legal thinkers to stake out views
that reject the dominant male perspective without first having to free
themselves of the restraints of a Feminist Jurisprudence.80
III. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF RACE AND THE LAW
A. Black Legal Scholarship and the Founders and Framers of the
Constitution
One way of defining Black Legal Scholarship is to contrast it with
the dominant legal scholarship about black Americans and the Constitu-
tion, which leaves black perspectives and experiences out of the law. The
Framers were the first contributors to this view of blacks and the law.
When the original draft of the Declaration of Independence included a
condemnation of King George for forcing the slave trade on the colonies,
it was removed because it was too controversial. 81 Similarly, the Fram-
ers did not mention slavery explicitly in any provision of the Constitution
or the Bill of Rights, which was passed shortly thereafter. Indeed, only
the passage of the thirteenth amendment ensured that future generations
of school children would even be taught that slavery existed. Without
such a constitutional reference, one can imagine some future editors of
history texts leaving out that somewhat difficult history. Most Ameri-
cans believe that because race is not mentioned, it cannot be a pivotal
issue. In law as in life, however, the unexplained and often unexplored
assumptions-the axioms that form the core of one's doctrine-often are
more important than the named constraints. A New York legislator put
doctor or lawyer-solely because of his race-to the son of a recent refugee from Eastern
Europe who is working as a manual laborer to get his family ahead....
Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 152-54.
79. See K. MORELLO, supra note 77, at 218-47.
80. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987); Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986);
Nadine Taub & Wendy Williams, Will Equality Require More than Assimilation, Accommodation or
Separation from the Existing Social Structure 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 825 (1985); Note, Toward a
Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1981). One should note that some of this
literature uses race cases to make its point about sexism. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, supra, at 63-69
(drawing parallels between the treatment of women and Native Americans in a predominantly white
male culture). It may be that being permitted to see law without the limitation of a prior jurispru-
dence will limit the feminist movement as much or more as the existence of a prior jurisprudence has
limited black legal scholarship.
81. See JOHN CHESTER MILLER, THE WOLF BY THE EARS: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SLAV-
ERY 1-11 (1977).
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it best in the discussion about the proposed wording of the new New
York Constitution in 1832. He said that if slavery was never mentioned
in the new constitution, then future generations would forget that slavery
had ever existed in New York.8 2 Similarly, many constitutional scholars
have failed to include the black perspective in their views of constitu-
tional interpretation. This liberal view of the Constitution and race, that
race is better left unexplored, prevailed in much of the constitutional
drafting. Even the drafting of the great Civil War amendments-the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments--conceived in the
shadow of the great American war and stained with the blood of consti-
tutional absolutism, suffers from this liberal bias against the explicit in-
clusion of blacks in the constitutional structure.
8 3
The original Constitution refers indirectly to blacks in four places;
84
yet race and slavery, although never explicitly mentioned, cemented the
82. ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRsT EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLMON OF SLAVERY IN THE
NORTH vii (1967).
83. The first legislation that blacks had some official role in creating was the Civil Rights Act of
1875. See John Hope Franklin, Martin Luther King, Jr. And the Afro-American Protest Tradition, in
WE SHALL OVERCOME 106-07 (Peter J. Albert & Ronald Hoffman eds. 1990).
84. The first clause of the U.S. Constitution in which slavery is indirectly implicated is article I,
§ 2, cl. 3, which provides that representation shall be based upon the "whole number of free persons,
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, threefifths of
all other Persons." Id. (emphasis added). The phrase "all other persons," of course, refers to black
slaves. This clause did not exclude from the census indentured servants, i.e., those bound to service
for a term of years, nor (though it is not clear from the passage) were women and children excluded
from the census and representation. Even Indians, who were taxed and accordingly were a part of
the general populace, were included in the census. Excluded from representation were untaxed Indi-
ans and two fifths of "other persons." This compromise, borrowed from the Articles of Confedera-
tion, consciously decided to treat slaves differently and to do so in a color neutral manner.
The other three veiled references to slavery are article IV, § 2, cl. 3 and article I, § 9, cl. 1, and
article V. Article IV provides,
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.
Id. art. IV. Article V provides for the process of amending the Constitution with two limitations:
that "no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." Id. art. V.
Article I, § 9, cl. I provides,
The Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand
eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
Id. article I, § 9, cl. 1. When read together, these four sections prevent the Congress from doing
anything, including amending the Constitution, to prevent the importation of black slaves before
1808, and they require those states that become sanctuaries for escaped slaves to return them to their
masters. In addition, by preventing the reduction in the number of Senators without a state's ap-
proval, the Constitution insured that there would not be a change in power in the Senate without the
approval of those slave states which made up approximately half of the states in the new country.
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Great Compromise between the Southern slave-holding states and the
Northern states together like a bloody glue.8 5
The most important example of the tendency to remove the black
experience and perspective from the law is found in the arguments of
those who advocate a return to original intent. To rely on original intent
is to hitch our interpretational scheme to a vision that excluded blacks.
Justice Thurgood Marshall made this point recently by giving a black
perspective on the original flawed nature of the Constitution. He noted
in his remarks that there really were two Constitutions. The first pro-
vided limited rights for large segments of the population. Justice Mar-
shall contended, however, that a second Constitution evolved through
the Civil War amendments and altered the constitutional framework so
that substantive rights were provided to black Americans and women.
Justice Marshall argued that this second Constitution, the post-Civil War
Constitution, ought to be considered the more important document.8
6
Justice Marshall's comments provoked a firestorm of criticism.
Some conservatives contended that these remarks reflect an attitude that
is inappropriate for a justice on the Supreme Court, and they called for
his resignation.8 7 Liberals also criticized Justice Marshall. Professor
Laurence Tribe of Harvard concluded that Marshall's view that the orig-
inal Constitution was flawed took the wrong approach to constitutional
William Wiecek has listed eight provisions of the Constitution that directly implicated slavery.
For example, Wiecek argued that the provisions invoking the federal power to suppress insurrections
and to protect states against domestic violence were largely directed toward prohibiting slavery. See
WILLIAM WIECEK, SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1760-1848, at 62-80 (1977).
I have not included these sections in this discussion because from this perspective-a perspective I
largely share-the entire Constitution was a reaction to slavery. The institution of slavery required a
more powerful central government as well as a government controlled by the states that were depen-
dent on slavery.
85. See, eg., MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
91-112 (1913) (discussing the development of the Great Compromise). But see William Wiecek, The
Witch at the Christening: Slavery and the Constitution's Origins, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICA-
TION OF THE CONSTrrUTION 167, 178-81 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds. 1987) (Slav-
ery was at the heart of the Great Compromise between the Southern slave-holding states and the
Northern states.).
86. Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution: A Living Document, 30 How. L.J. 915 (1987).
87. For an example of this attitude, see Tony Mauro, Washington Legal Foundation Marks 10
Conservative Years, MANHATrAN LAWYER, December 8, 1987, at 13. Mauro argued,
Justice Thurgood Marshall failed to heed the WLF's (Washington Legal Foundation) call
to resign because of his critical stance on the bicentennial celebration for the U.S. Constitu-
tion. "I hate the double standard," [Dan] Popeo [Legal counsel for WLF] said. "You've
got all these people running around worrying about Robert Bork's vision of America, and
here you have Thurgood Marshall on the sunny shores of Hawaii asking, Why celebrate
the Bicentennial? He clearly holds a bias, a prejudice that makes him unfit to serve."
Id. See also Ted Gest, Blasts Bicentennial of Constitution; Justice Marshall's minority report, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 18, 1987, at 12.
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interpretation. 8 However, Marshall's view-the quintessential Black
Jurisprudence-does not go far enough. He notes that blacks were not
involved as participants in the original intent, but he is unwilling to de-
mand black participation in constitutional formation. It is a persistent
myth held by constitutional experts that the political wisdom that existed
in 1787 and 1868 created a kind of Athenian citizenship that-although
originally imperfect in its exclusion of blacks, women, and the poor-was
eventually extended by constitutional amendment and statute to include
all Americans. This view seems fundamentally flawed. It argues that
only the views and perspectives of the white participants in the creation
of the Constitution should be heard.
There are four, often unstated, justifications for the original intent
approach. First, it is possible to argue that the process that was created
was good and that the political wisdom inherent in the Great Compro-
mise of 1787 and in the creation of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif-
teenth amendments after the Civil War created a utopian notion of legal
rights and citizenship.89 This argument is not persuasive because this
88. See Laurence Tribe, Roots and Limits of Judicial Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL ROOTS,
RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 23-24 (1987).
89. The writings of John McCord are typical of the group of scholars that puts forth this view.
Professor McCord opines:
The Civil Rights Movement was announced at Philadelphia on July 4, 1776. A group of
self-styled representatives of a people which enjoyed unequal station declared that they
were free and "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
ness." After freedom was won, an organic civil rights act, the Bill of Rights, was a first
order of business.
Nearly a century later, a constituent people, accidentally black, also were declared to
be free and the organic law of civil rights was extended to this constituent minority....
[W]e think it important initially to note that freedom and human aspiration, government
and civil rights, and the integrity of society and of its legal institutions do not comprehend
essentially different things when considered in the context of different classes of people. All
civil rights movements are one in principle and one in realization. The distortion of a princi-
ple or the denial of aspiration affects all society, not merely the individual or class deprived.
In this light, the Negro Civil Rights Movement is not unique; it is a contemporary expression
of the Civil Rights Movement of 1776.
WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED, at V (John McCord ed. 1969) (emphases added). This argument
seems silly in light of the history of the Constitution's adoption and the background of racism that
informs that history. In addition, it is odd to suggest that a Bill of Rights was the first order of
business for the new nation when it was not included in the constitution which was adopted substan-
tially after the Revolutionary War was won at Yorktown in 1784. However, at the very heart of this
view is the argument, often unstated, that the condition of black Americans was an accident uncon-
nected to the color of their skins. If the race of black Americans is not important in determining the
status ofblack Americans it is hard to think of what is important. Racism is not an accident; it was
and is intentional. See, e.g., Chief Justice Taney's decision in Dred Scot v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 451 (1856) (stating that the Constitution makes no distinction between the property of
the master in a slave and any other property).
The view that the American Constitution has this special niche in history is not limited to law
professors. Alan Bloom dismissed the early history of race and racism in the Constitution. Bloom
labels the Constitution as the finest political gift that Western Civilization has given the world. He
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vision of "Athenian citizenship" has not created social or economic
equality for black Americans. The success of this notion of American
citizenship for other politically dispossessed groups of 1787 does not
mean that it can or should be expected to work for black Americans. 90
Second, it can be argued that it is not possible to infer what black
people would have successfully argued about the Constitution and what
concessions would have been won. Who would represent the blacks of
1787-the blacks who were free, or some illusory black aristocracy, simi-
lar to the group of white Americans who represented white America and
created the constitutional principles?
This argument also is flawed. Although it is difficult to discern how
black Americans would have impacted the Constitution, it is no more
difficult than determining the assumptions that underlie the original in-
tent of the Framers' writings. After all, what we now view as the most
important notes of the constitutional convention were not available for
the first fifty years of constitutional litigation.91 In fact, a useful question
not clearly answered by the available evidence is whether the Framers
intended that their ideas that were unexpressed in the Constitution
should shape our understanding of the constitutional process.
It is particularly odd to exclude the perspectives of blacks on the
Constitution when the views of those who opposed the adoption of the
understands that for blacks to demand a place in the creation of constitutional values is a demand for
power that his view of the Constitution cannot countenance. See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF
THE AMERICAN MIND 33-34 (1987). For the reasons he is wrong, see infra notes 52-64 and accom-
panying text. George Anastaplo writes:
Various of the amendments make explicit, or confirm, what had been taken for granted or
at least had been aimed at from the outset. Even the Civil War amendments-the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments-are consistent with, if not called for by,
the American constitutional spirit.
GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 11 (1989). See also Walter Dellinger, 1787
The Constitution and "The Curse of Heaven'" A Commentary, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145 (1987).
Dellinger argues that "both slavery and race have had an enormous impact on the development of
the American Constitution, and we cannot fully understand our present constitutional conflicts over
the permissible use of race unless we understand the role of race in our constitutional origins and
throughout constitutional history." Id. at 152.
90. The extent to which this actually has happened for the poor, except for the poor whites of
Appalachia, is outside the scope of this Article. The few who have examined the question normally
have asked the question about today's poor who, although descended from poor whites, are not a
permanent class of poor people. Except for black Americans, there has been no class of serfs. See L.
HARTZ, supra note 30.
91. James Madison's NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, stands as
"the standard authority for the proceedings of the Convention," despite being unavailable until fifty
years after the convention." Adrienne Koch, Introduction, xxiii, in JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787 at xxiii (1966). But see ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990) ("The common objection to the philosophy of original under-
standing-that Madison kept his notes of the convention at Philadelphia secret for many years-is
off the mark. He knew that what mattered was public understanding, not subjective intentions.").
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Constitution at the Convention and who did not sign it are consulted and
included by those who would discern "original" intent.92 When we in-
clude the views of such "Framers" in our interpretation and exclude
black participation, we give a preference to those "Framers'" views that
can only be due to skin color.
Those who hold the dominant view that blacks have nothing to add
to original intent also make the assumption that there were no common
themes that could be the basis of a "black" perspective on the Constitu-
tion. In the process of posing, in constitutional terms, the unthinkable
question of the place of the black experience in constitutional thought,
we create a need to consider how black Framers would have reshaped the
Constitution in ways that are sensitive to the black experience. More
evidence than we acknowledge is available for this task.93
Third, it can be argued that blacks had nothing to add to the process
of defining American citizenship. What could black Americans provide
that Thomas Jefferson did not include in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence or that Benjamin Franklin and James Madison did not add to the
Constitution?94 This contention makes the fundamentally ethnocentric
assumption that black perspectives on legal questions do not matter be-
cause there are no real differences between the perspectives of blacks and
whites. Under this view, slavery was an aberration whose effects were
erased by the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. And after the
passage of these amendments, the Court could hold that law had done
enough to save black Americans and their interests. Writing for an
eight-man majority in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley took this
view:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes
the rank of mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the
laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected.95
From this perspective, the black experience becomes irrelevant to
the process of defining rights. When Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to limit the power of the states to mandate segregation, Con-
92. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985). For example, Edmund Randolph, George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry were all present
at the Philadelphia Convention, but refused to sign the final draft of the Constitution. In spite of
their refusal, their views are taken into account by those who seek the original intent of the Framers.
93. For example, Professor Waldo Martin discussed the views of Frederick Douglass on the
Civil War Amendments and the role of race and slavery in the Constitution in WALDO MARTIN, JR.,
THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 136-64 (1984).
94. See Bell, Foreword, supra note 25, at 4-5.
95. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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gress chose not to rely on the amendments that are supposed to remedy
the effects of slavery. Instead, Congress primarily relied on the Com-
merce Clause.96 Given the option of examining the continued racism
through the lens of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments,
the Congress and the courts chose to use other means.97 This approach
means that justice is still defined in terms that derive from the perspec-
tives of white citizens. Black interests in this question have been, and
still are, ignored. 98 The real reason that black perspectives are excluded
from this discussion is that most white scholars and white people believe
it is improper for blacks to raise or make such claims on the Constitution
or judicial interpretation.
The final unstated rationale for excluding black perspectives from
the definition of original intent is that the citizens who created the Con-
stitution in 1787 created a contract that all citizens join implicitly in ac-
cepting citizenship in the United States. This contract was extended and
made even more appropriate by the extension of the right to vote to
blacks and to women by the fifteenth and the nineteenth amendments.99
Presumably blacks, if they did not like this contract, could have left the
American republic. There were substantial efforts before,l °° during,101
and after 02 the Civil War to extract blacks from the United States by
"repatriating" them to Africa or by sending blacks to the Caribbean or
Brazil. In addition, some black leaders opposed colonization-the forced
96. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 96-101 (2d ed. 1980). See also
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that the commerce
power was adequate grounds for congressional civil rights action).
97. This ignores the important fact that the legislatures and the Congress that passed and rati-
fied these amendments were essentially all white. Black concerns were only partially heard by these
"representative" bodies.
98. For a more comprehensive attempt to address this question, see Randall Kennedy, Equality
as a Constitutional Concept, 47 MD. L. REV. 46 (1987); Randall Kennedy, Afro-American Faith in
the Civil Religion; or Yes, I Would Sign the Constitution, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163 (1987).
99. See supra note 89.
100. See, e.g., LOUIS FILLER, CRUSADE AGAINST SLAVERY: FRIENDS, FoEs, AND REFORMS,
1820-1860, at 26, 32, 38, 115, 252 (1986); GEORGE FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE
WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 113-
118 (1972). These efforts included several antislavery novels that argued that the resolution was
emigration. See ELIZABETH ROE, AUNT LEANNA: ON EARLY SCENES IN KENTUCKY (1855); HAR-
RIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (1852). See generally LORENZO TURNER, ANTI-
SLAVERY SENTIMENT IN AMERICAN LITERATURE PRIOR TO 1865 (1929).
101. See Douglass, What Shall Be Done With the Freed Slaves?, in 3 THE LIFE AND WRITING
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 297-99; CHARLES STROZIER, LINCOLN'S QUEST FOR
UNION: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEANINGS 175-77 (1982).
102. EMMA THORNBROUGH, T. THOMAS FORTUNE, MILITANT JOURNALIST 70-75 (1972).
There were also always movements among blacks for voluntary returns to Africa, including calls by
Paul Cuffe, Martin Delaney, and Bishop Henry McNeal Turner for emigration to Africa. The most
famous effort, of course, is that of Marcus Garvey. See JOHN CLARKE, MARCUS GARVEY AND THE
VISION OF AFRICA (1974).
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repatriation of black Americans-but argued that blacks should consider
emigration to South or Central America.10 3 All of these efforts failed
because Congress was unwilling to provide the wherewithal to transport
blacks to some other place, because of the hostility of those other places
to the specter of thousands of American blacks being transported into
their midst,104 and because black Americans claimed that they in fact
were Americans and could not be forced to emigrate.105
The other members of the American polity either are descendants of
those who helped create the American Constitution, or they or their an-
cestors voluntarily came to America as immigrants who, it may be ar-
gued, accepted the constitutional contract when they embarked on boats
and planes to come here. It is true that many immigrants faced dire
economic straits or were under other constraints that led them to come
to America, but those problems, particularly in the 19th and early 20th
century, were not the result of actions by the United States. Most immi-
grants came to the United States, at least partly, because of the rules
produced by the Constitution-not in spite of them.
Contract analysis requires some consent that is voluntarily produced
and freely joined by the people. Yet black Americans never experienced
such a choice with respect to the American Constitution. They were not
active participants either in Philadelphia in 1787 or in Washington in the
1860s when the constitutional framework was created. The vast majority
of black Americans were not voluntary immigrants to the United States
and, therefore, did not consent to the "constitutional contract." If courts
attempt to use the contract notion to justify the imposition of the consti-
tution, more support is required for inferring a voluntary acceptance of
this Constitution by blacks.
All four of these contentions grow out of an originalist perspective
of the Constitution. Most constitutional scholars would reject the notion
103. Among those leaders was Henry H. Garnet. See STIRLING STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE
180-88 (1987). Indeed, although most black leaders vehemently opposed the colonization efforts of
whites in the antebellum period, they were of two minds about how blacks ought to view themselves.
So, for example, Frederick Douglass, one of the great integrationist and one who eventually argued
that the Constitution was an antislavery document, could say, in opposition to charges that he was
not attached to this country, "I have no love for America, as such; I have no patriotism; I have no
country. What country have I? The institutions of this country do not know me, do not recognize
me as a man." Frederick Douglass, National Anti-Slavery Standard, May 20, 1847, reprinted in 5
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 522 n.59. Garnet, the noted
nationalist, responded that blacks had rights in America. See S. STUCKEY, supra, at 175.
104. WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 549-62 (1968); Warren A. Beck, Lincoln and
Negro Colonization in Central America, 6 ABRAHAM LINCOLN QUARTERLY 162 (1950).
105. See Frederick Douglass, Speech at American Anti-Slavery Society (May 1848), reprinted in 5
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 78-85.
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of originalism.10 6 Even some of those scholars who would not com-
pletely reject originalism contend that the document as written has no
meaning. They would argue that the most important factor in thinking
about the Constitution has to do with understanding and creating present
interpretations of constitutional principles.10 7 The past is considered ir-
relevant to much of that interpretation unless it directly tells the present
interpreters how to view the Constitution with respect to our present
problems. This view of the history is much too narrow: It fundamen-
tally-although very much in the tradition of American experience-ig-
nores the importance of original understandings to thinking about the
Constitution and the development of American law.
Almost all notions of originalism are subject to the criticism that
they ask black concerns to defer to white concerns. Blacks were not con-
sulted by the "Founders" nor were their concerns considered relevant by
the drafters. Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence and
Madison wrote the preliminary draft of the Constitution-Frederick
Douglass did not. Black people cannot enter the dispute about how to
define essential terms because they were not present. "Defer to the past"
is the implicit message. Listen to the wiser and greater (and whiter)
founders.
Justice Powell's opinion in the Bakke case is just such a call for the
deference of black Americans to white concerns.108 Powell concluded
that the University of California, a state institution, should be able to
give preference in admission to the sons and daughters of its formerly all-
white alumni and to the sons and daughters of the essentially all-white
political elite, but that it does not have an equal interest in increasing the
number of blacks in medicine in a state that had never graduated a black
doctor from a state medical school. 1 9 The only explanation offered by
Justice Powell and the majority of those who have spoken on the issue is
106. This is true even of conservative and law and economics scholars. See, e.g., RICHARD POS-
NER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 293-99 (1990) (noting that by looking for answers in
constitutional and statutory texts, "originaists" tend to ignore one of the key tenets of traditional
legal reasoning-precedent that interprets those texts); Richard Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42
STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1373-80 (1990) (plain meaning and originalism are difficult concepts to achieve
for judges and should not be adopted by federal judges in the sense that Judge Bork suggests).
107. See, eg., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONsrrruTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
91-145 (1982) (Perry argues for noninterpretist ways of thinking about the Constitution and asserts
that the key function of noninterpretive review is the enforcement by the court of values not consti-
tutionalized by the Framers.); John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92
HARV. L. REv. 5, 15 (1978) (arguing that an important part of the Court's jurisprudence involves
weighing the merits of certain policy or ethical judgments against certain fundamental values).
108. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
109. Id. at 310-11.
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that it is perfectly acceptable to require black interests to defer to white
interests.
White interests are "first," "original," "produced by the foun-
ders," 110 or in some other manner take precedence over the rights of
black people in this country. In adopting this approach, the Court
clearly has not escaped the deference to the past that has governed rela-
tions between blacks and whites since blacks were wrenched from the
coast of Africa.
When we ignore the history of racism in America; we fail to under-
stand the history and present configuration of the American legal system.
To take just one example, there was a very strong tradition in the English
common law that innkeepers and others who had monopoly power over
resources or who operated public accommodations were required to open
them to the public unless the person seeking access was somehow dis-
qualified. 11 This tradition was carried into the American legal system,
but the current rule is just the opposite: Anyone can be excluded-in-
cluding exclusion for reasons of racial animus-unless exclusion violates
an explicit civil rights statute.112 As one New Jersey court noted, "[t]he
denial of freedom of reasonable access in some states following passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the creation of a common law freedom
to arbitrarily exclude following invalidation of segregation statutes, sug-
gest that the current majority rule may have had less than dignified
origins."
113
Unfortunately, little has been written about how this change oc-
curred or why. Charles Haar and Daniel Fessler have examined the an-
cient doctrine of the duty of public carriers in a Southern discriminatory
context and have ignored the racial aspect of how the duty of innkeepers
and others evolved because of the post-Civil War racism.1 14 They take
110. See Edwin Meese, Interpreting the Constitution, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13 (Jack Rakove ed. 1990). For the most forceful support for
originalism, see R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 91, at 139-78. For a discussion
of the almost religious view of the founders toward the Constitution, see MICHAEL KAMMEN, A
MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF (1986).
111. See, eg., Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 170-74, 445 A.2d 370, 373-75
(1982) (discussing common law tradition that those who operated public accommodations could not
exclude people arbitrarily and unreasonably).
112. Id. at 171, 445 A.2d at 374.
113. Id. at 171 n.4, 445 A.2d at 374 n.4.
114. See CHARLES HAAR & DANIEL FESSLER, FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE (1986) (legacy of the
Civil War and the changes produced by post-reconstruction jurisprudence is ignored). I fear black
legal scholars who have begun to look at this question have fared no better. See LeMarquis
DeJarmon, Public Accommodations, in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED, supra note 89, at 85, 87
(discussing innkeepers and common carriers without reference to post-Civil War racism and its im-
pact on access to public accommodations).
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the racial present as a given and do not question how or why we came to
this position.
Similarly, property law owes much to the existence of slavery, and
the notion of human property has shaped American law. Yet, the two
most innovative thinkers on property--one a disciple of conservative in-
dividualism and the other the leading liberal theoretician-looked at the
issue of property and takings and did not ask what limits the American
history of slavery has placed on our thinking about property.1 15 Perhaps
this is a result of the inadequacies in the legal education of this genera-
tion's scholars.1 16 Whatever the source of the incomplete understanding
of the relationship between property and slavery, the essential point is
that, without such an understanding, a considerable amount of history
lacks explanation.
Legal scholars have virtually ignored the issue of race in thinking
about what is important in the formulation of legal theory. However, we
cannot understand the potential power of the law unless we understand
how law has strained and contorted itself under the constraints imposed
by the history of racism in American law. In an age when it is at least a
social misdemeanor-if not a full-fledged social felony-to accuse any-
one of racism, it is time for legal scholars to see, understand, and deal
with the racism of our legal history. Those who deny that they are
bound by original understandings must accordingly deal with the lessons
of two hundred years of these understandings.
B. Four Ways of Looking at Race and the Law
There are four ways to construct the basic relationships between
race and the law that have dominated the legal experience of black
Americans. The pattern of laws is not exactly the same for any state or
115. Bruce Ackerman does not mention slavery or race at all. Even though his is a policy book
and not a history book, it is likely that thinking about how race would impact on the notion of
property and takings would have enlarged and possibly ennobled the book. See BRUCE A. ACKER-
MAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). Richard Epstein mentions slavery in
passing in a footnote and uses racial discrimination as an example. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS 335 n.7 (1986). Because Epstein, in places, contends he is doing history, he has less of an
excuse. This tendency to ignore the impact of slavery on the law is not a new phenomenon. See
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY UNITED STATES (1956). Despite the fact that Hurst is writing immediately after Brown and
during the Montgomery Bus Boycott, slavery is barely mentioned, and when it does appear, it is with
little insight into the contribution of slavery to the problem: "Circumstances through the first three-
quarters of the century thus never called for a major test of attitudes toward protecting the status
quo simply as such, unless one counts the issue of slavery as an instance." Id. at 25.
116. See A. Leon Higgenbotham, Jr., Book Review, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1044, 1047 (1974) (not-
ing that the failure of American legal education to properly address racial issues has contributed to
our present inability to properly correct the resulting injustices).
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its colonial predecessor. Not all law has followed these constructions in
the order that they will be discussed, but all American law as it interacts
with the issue of race has been dependent on these notions. These con-
structions began in the frustrating chains of slavery, continued through
the exhilaration of the Reconstruction and the tragedy of "Redemption,"
and have continued into the present imperfect relationship of blacks
within the legal structure.
Black people in America went through three of these constructions
of the legal relationship during slavery. Initially, the law largely ignored
black slaves and treated them as non-beings. 117 Eventually, the law
evolved into a paternalistic system that treated blacks as lesser beings
whom white masters and overseers needed to protect from their own ig-
norant, sloven, and evil nature. 118 Finally, the slave law created legal
rules that provided for legal limitations on the activities of slaves and
117. The Constitution referred to black slaves as "other persons." U.S. CONST., art 1, § 2, cl. 3.
See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 22-26 (1978) (describing judicial
refusal to recognize rights for slaves in colonial Virginia); see also Dellinger, Curse of Heaven, supra
note 89, at 154-56 (1987). Professor Dellinger argues that this conscious refusal to admit slavery
explicitly or to acknowledge its legitimacy under the natural rights imbedded in the Constitution and
the Declaration of Independence meant that the Constitution implicitly rejected the notion of slavery
as being proper, and the idea of blacks as being inferior. However, one could just as easily argue that
the Southerners who wanted to protect slavery in the Constitution could and did claim that the
silence of the Constitution on the rights of blacks and slavery was an endorsement of a different
status.
118. See, eg., W. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 103-110 (1968) (discussing the origin of the Slave
Codes and the behaviors they were designed to regulate). The South Carolina black code, borrowed
from Barbados, stated this purpose as late as 1735:
WHEREAS, the plantations and estates of this Province cannot be well and sufficiently
managed and brought into use, without the labor and service of negroes and other slaves;
and forasmuch as the said negroes and other slaves brought unto the people of the Province
for that purpose, are of barbarous, wild, savage natures, and such as renders them wholly
unqualified to be governed by the laws, customs, and practices of this Province; but that it
is absolutely necessary, that such other constitutions laws and orders, should in this Prov-
ince be made and enacted, for the good regulating and ordering of them, as may restrain
the disorders, rapines and inhumanity to which they are naturally prone and inclined ....
Id. at 109-10. Jordan described the problem of paternalism in this way:
While the colonial slave codes seem at first sight to have been intended to discipline Ne-
groes, to deny them freedoms available to other Americans, a very slight shift in perspec-
tive shows the codes in a different light: they aimed, paradoxically, at disciplining white
men. Principally, the law told the white man, not the Negro, what he must do; the codes
were for the eyes and ears of slaveowners ....
Id. at 108.
Richard Wade describes the paternalism of the urban areas, where the courts and others tried to
discipline and control the idleness and laziness of blacks. See RICHARD WADE, SLAVERY IN THE
CITIES: THE SOUTH, 1820-1860, at 80-110 (1964); see also HERBERT GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAM-
ILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at 531-44 (1976) (describing the argument for the need
during and after slavery for whites to protect blacks from their own inherent bad habits).
Eugene Genovese argues that the creation of paternalism was a product of the slaves' under-
standing that legal rules would not protect them; they thus strived for paternalistic protection in-
stead of legal protection. See EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE
SLAVES MADE 49 (1976).
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their masters; in other words, the state stepped between slaves and mas-
ters and imposed external rules.1 9 Thus, there are three powerful con-
structions of law that slavery has bequeathed to legal interpretation-
ignoring blacks altogether, treating blacks paternalistically, and creating
limited legal rules to regulate white behavior toward blacks. 120 The post-
slavery period added a fourth powerful way of constructing the legal en-
vironment: The requirement that blacks, in participating in the legal en-
vironment, defer to the interests of the white majority. For this reason,
American law has been and continues to be unequal and separate with
respect to the interests of blacks.
119. See, eg., BARBARA JEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE GROUND
23-62 (1985) (Maryland's development of free black population and urban population of black slaves
led to legal changes); W. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 103-10 (1968) (there was a need to develop rules
to limit activities of white slave masters); R. WADE, supra note 118 (growth of free population and
the development of changes in strict slavery system required the growth and development of legal
rules and limitations which went beyond rules applicable in rural areas). This contrasts with Roman
law, in which slaves were not public property but the responsibility of the owners. See A. WATSON,
supra note 6, at 63-82 (1989). In the United States, slaves were severely restricted in their ability to
do things. In many places they could not keep cattle or hire out their labor even with the approval
of their master. The state prescribed what kind of conduct was necessary by both slave and master,
and if the master did not inflict the stated penalty for certain slave offenses, it was inflicted on the
slave by governmental authority. Id. at 66.
120. In discussing this legal relationship, I emphasize the relationship of black slaves to the law.
However, the law in the North and the South treated free blacks in ways that were very similar to
the treatment of black slaves. Black "freeman" in the South were subject to an array of constantly
changing rules that limited their rights and required them to be subordinate to whites of any station
at any time. See IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 316-40 (1974) (detailing the rights and
privileges that free blacks were regularly denied). Free blacks of the North were also subject to a
vast array of unequal and subordinating legal provisions. See, eg., LEONARD P. CURRY, THE FREE
BLACK IN URBAN AMERICA, 1800-1850, at 81-95 (1986) (describing legal provisions in the North
and South limiting the freedom of blacks); JACQUE VOEGELI, FREE BUT NOT EQUAL 1-9 (1967)
(describing the "color-caste system" present in every state).
All three of the ways of treating black slaves were inflicted on Northern blacks as well. For
example, the Ohio legislature in 1839 passed a resolution that stated:
The blacks and mulattoes, who may be residents within this State, have no constitutional
right to present their petitions to the General Assembly for any purpose whatsoever, and
that any reception of such petitions on the part of the General Assembly is a mere act of
privilege or policy and not imposed by any expressed or implied power of the constitution.
L. CURRY, supra, at 87 (citation omitted) (quoting FRANK QUILLIN, COLOR LINE IN OHIO 52
(1913)). This provision embodies all three principles of black treatment in American law. The reso-
lution by implication denies citizenship to blacks who reside in the state, permitting the state to put
them outside the law as if they did not exist. It suggests that the white General Assembly will
consider such petitions if it chooses to, in other words, if the legislature believes that it is in the
paternalistic interest of black people. Curry noted that "[w]hen blacks were brought before magis-
trates on any save the most serious charges, the court reporters made them figures of fun-exagger-
ating (or fabricating) their mannerisms, dialect, and ignorance of legal forms." Id. at 93. Blacks had
some rights to use the legal process and there were some limits on how whites could treat black
freeman in the North, but this limitation was often more in form than substance. If the legal rules
were not formally being cut back, then they were being eliminated by ridicule and disinterest on the
part of judges and law enforcement personnel. Id.
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These four different ways of viewing black Americans are not simply
an evolutionary progression: The law continues to embody all four of
these elements in its interpretation of the legal protections available to
black Americans. In this sense, there is no past or future for the treat-
ment of black citizens-instead there is only a mushy present that retains
all of its past even as it alters the forms of black treatment.
In many ways, the legal process has come full circle. The experience
of black Americans when they first came to the United States was that
they were often ignored by the law. 121 And judges, through the doctrine
of color-blind neutrality, are again ignoring the concerns of blacks in
their decisions.
A recent example of this phenomenon is Rankin v. McPherson. 122
Ardith McPherson, a black woman, was working as a deputy constable
but was still within the probationary employment period.12 3 Ms. MC-
Pherson's position did not require her-indeed, did not permit her-to
act as a licensed police officer.124 On the day that President Reagan was
shot, she said to her boyfriend, who also was an employee of the consta-
ble's office, "[I]f they go for him [Reagan] again, I hope they get him."
125
Ms. McPherson was fired from her job for making this statement and
subsequently she sued to be reinstated. 126 The Supreme Court held that
she was wrongfully fired because, given her job, the state's interest in
dismissing an employee with such views did not outweigh the employee's
first amendment interests. The most fascinating aspect of the case, how-
ever, is how the different justices dealt with the reality of Ms. McPher-
son's race.
Justice Marshall, who wrote the majority opinion, specifically men-
tioned that Ms. McPherson is black-a matter that neither Justice Pow-
ell nor Justice Scalia included in their opinions. Leaving race out of their
opinions was not an accident. Both Justices Powell and Scalia believe
that race is irrelevant-even when it is crucial to understanding the con-
text that gives rise to a case. The law seems to take this color-blind ap-
proach most often when a color-conscious approach would lend
perspective to the situation of a black participant in the legal process.
Why, then, does Justice Marshall mention that Ms. McPherson was
black? The answer is clear from the perspective of the black experience.
Much of the lives of black people are spent in anger over real and
121. See JOHN B. BOLEs, BLACK SOUTHERNERS: 1619-1869, at 20-24 (1984).
122. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
123. Id. at 380.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 381.
126. Id. at 382.
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imagined slights by white landlords, supervisors, and bosses. In a coun-
try in which black perspectives are so out of line with those of others in
the country, 127 our only power is to speak to ourselves. Justice Marshall,
author of much public criticism of President Reagan and President
Bush,128 often uses the dialect of black people-a dialect that permits
black people to criticize powerful people in a somewhat veiled fashion.
Justice Marshall understood Ms. McPherson's comments in this light
and he sought to infuse his opinion with a fact essential to the under-
127. For example, in 1984, 63% of whites and only 11% of blacks voted for Ronald Reagan. See
ABC News Exit Poll cited in Paul Light & Celinda Lake, The Election: Candidates, Strategies, and
Decisions in THE ELEcTIONS OF 1984, at 106 (Michael Nelson ed. 1985). In 1980, 12% of blacks
voted for Reagan while a majority of whites in the country voted for him. Reagan, of course, is not
the only recent American President to earn the ire of black Americans. After a white mob in South
Boston attacked school buses taking black children to white schools, President Ford said that he was
opposed to the court orders that required busing of Boston's public school children. At a news
conference, Ford exclaimed, "I have consistently opposed forced busing to achieve racial balance as
a solution to quality education, and therefore, I respectfully disagree with the judge's order [in Mor-
gan v. Kerrigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d
580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975)]." Roy Wilkins, then-Executive Director of the
NAACP, recognized the danger that might arise as a result of the President's remarks. Wilkins
explained that these comments would encourage further resistance among whites, and "could result
in the maiming or killing of black children." William Chapman & William Claiborne, Ford Decries
Boston School Busing Order, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1974, at Al, col. 4.
Richard Pryor often talks about "Mudbone," who is mistreated by his white mistress and whose
only recourse is to get mad, or do something and leave the state of Mississippi. Like this fictional
character, black people seldom expect to have the opportunity to tell off offending politicians or deal
with even more immediate problems like their bosses. See Richard Pryor, Mudbone Introduction, Is
It Something I Said? (Reprise Records 1975).
128. See Lionel Barber, Judge Scoffs at Bush Nominee, FINANCIAL TIMEs, July 28, 1990, at 3;
Marshall's Ire: A Justice v. The President, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1987, § 4, at 4, col. 6.
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standing of the context-Ms. McPherson's race. 2 9 Race matters to Jus-
tice Marshall just as it does not matter to his colleagues.
130
Judges do not always tell us when and for what purpose a fact is
important, but the absence of race considerations in general is no acci-
dent; it reflects the view that race is irrelevant to understanding the cir-
cumstances surrounding an incident, despite the fact that, in reality, race
colors most situations in which whites and blacks interact.
It is not simply that some white judges did not mention that Ms.
McPherson was black. 3 1 For those judges, the fact that a party is black
does not change the perspective from which any issue should be ex-
amined. 132 However, because the world is implicitly examined from the
129. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 382-86. However, Justice Marshall did not use all that he knew. He
noted in footnote four of that opinion:
Rankin testified that, when he asked McPherson whether she meant the remark, she re-
plied, "I sure do.".. . In neither of its opinions in this case did the District Court make an
explicit finding regarding which version of this conflicting testimony it found credible....
We note that the question whether McPherson "meant" the statement is ambiguous. As-
suming that McPherson told Rankin she "meant it," McPherson might think she had said
that she "meant" that she disliked the President and would not mind if he were dead, while
Rankin might believe that McPherson "meant" to indicate approval of, or in any event
hope for, political assassination. This ambiguity makes evident the need for carefully con-
ducted hearings and precise and complete findings of fact.
Id. at 382 n.4. Justice Marshall understands that the factual finding is irrelevant to whether Ms.
McPherson represents a danger to either the criminal justice system or President Reagan. Ms. Mc-
Pherson's remarks simply reflected the irritation many black people feel toward former President
Reagan.
The discussion of what was meant by Ms. McPherson's words assumes that it is possible to find
a definitive meaning to the words independent of context. Furthermore, it is possible for Ms. Mc-
Pherson to mean several different things. Perhaps part of the unstated premise is that Ms. McPher-
son should be careful to mean something to those who would overhear what she said. Critical theory
teaches us that there is no simple or easy way to find or enforce meaning in such situations. See
BARBARA HERRNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE (1988).
130. The only possible reason to ignore the reality of Ms. McPherson's race was that Justice
Marshall's colleagues would not understand the power and truth of this fact. By dwelling on a
matter that his white colleagues cannot understand, Justice Marshall, in a sense, plays a trick on the
Court.
131. The white judges who examined this case in the district court and on the Fifth Circuit (with
divergent conclusions) also did not mention that McPherson was black. See McPherson v. Rankin,
786 F.2d 1233 (1985) (Higginbotham, J.). Note, however, that in Hill v. City of Houston, Judge
Higginbotham does refer to the homosexuality of the plaintiff:
At the time of his arrest, Raymond Hill was forty-one years old, a homosexual, and a
resident of Houston, Texas... and helped form the Houston Gay Political Caucus. He has
since been a vocal advocate of the homosexual cause, and was on the Caucus' Board of
Directors at the time of trial. In addition to employment as a paralegal, he also did radio
shows for a local community service broadcasting station and, accordingly, carried a press
badge.... We draw out these background facts, not to suggest that Hill is entitled to any
greater or lesser first amendment protection because of them, but in order to provide a
more complete picture of the individual who confronted Officers Kelley and Holtsclaw.
Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1116-17 & n.l (5th Cir. 1986) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
132. I am not suggesting that there is some moral superiority on the part of black judges to see
all issues. Note, for example, the failure of most of the justices (except for Justice O'Connor) to
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perspective of the white majority, this claim of colorblindness actually
discriminates. Justice Marshall understands that if the law is to be truly
fair it must be in touch with the black experience.
Recent examples of the problem of white lack of awareness of racial
involvement can be found in Justice Scalia's opinion in Rankin. Justice
Scalia put the question in its clearest light at the very beginning of his
dissenting opinion. He stated,
I agree with the proposition, felicitously put by Constable Rankin's
counsel, that no law enforcement agency is required by the First
Amendment to permit one of its employees to "ride with the cops and
cheer for the robbers.... ." The issue in this case is whether Constable
Rankin, a law enforcement official, is prohibited by the First Amend-
ment from preventing his employees from saying of the attempted as-
sassination of President Reagan- on the job and within hearing of
other employees-"If they go for him again, I hope they get him."
1 33
Why does Justice Scalia find it important that Ms. McPherson was on
the job? Arguably, Ms. McPherson was not on the job but on her lunch
break when she made the statement-and it was made in a way that
makes it clear that Ms. McPherson did not intend for it to be "within the
hearing of other employees." Why then does Justice Scalia reach out to
find facts that are not there in order to make his case stronger?
134
A careful reading of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion suggests that,
in fact, race is the determining factor in shaping how he perceives this
case. The real reason he is concerned about the statement has nothing to
do with how this statement will impact the morale of the police force.
(This incident, after all, happened some 2000 miles away from the at-
tempted assassination of then-President Reagan, in another jurisdiction.)
In my view, Justice Scalia's real concern is that Ms. McPherson has over-
review the shocking decision, rendered by the district court and upheld by the court of appeals, that
Christine Craft could be dismissed from her job as a television anchor because she was not attractive
enough. See Craft v. Metromedia, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
It may be that male judges have a hard time seeing the sexism associated with imposing higher and
different standards on female anchors than on male ones. I do not believe that Justice Marshall
would have failed to see the problems associated with such an issue if it had been a more typical
racial setting. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-42, 250-52 (1989), a majority of
the Supreme Court found that sex stereotyping may be actionable discrimination under Title VII
and approved a lower court finding of such stereotyping.
133. Rankin. 483 U.S. at 394 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted and emphasis added).
134. To strengthen his case, Justice Scalia could have argued that such statements were
equivalent to the statements of white police officers in support of the Ku Klux Klan in McMullen v.
Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (1 1th Cir. 1985). But this argument is not available to Justice Scalia; although
he would probably view race as significant in McMullen, he cannot see that race plays a role in
Rankin. In McMullen a white sheriff's office employee who publicly acknowledged his Klan status
on a television program was held dischargeable because of the inability of the city to perform its
functions with Klan employees, and because the balance between the employees' right and that of
the employer favors the employer. Id. at 938-60.
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stepped the permissible bounds of her right to be black-by which I
mean the right to take personally the political statements made by a
white politician that seemed directed at black people. 3 -5 Justice Scalia
believes that people who are given the honor of being public servants
have no right to express such hostility toward the President of the United
States.
It is important to understand what the vast majority of black Ameri-
cans understand about the statement of Ms. McPherson; she meant the
statement only as a part of the hyperbole to which black anger is limited
in the United States. She did not mean for these statements, which were
directed to her black fianc6, to be overheard by her white colleagues. It
is also important to understand what all black people know, which is that
they speak more than one language, and the language at home is often
angry and always different from the common language spoken in public.
Justice Marshall alone acknowledged this possibility in the majority
opinion, yet he stopped short of an explicitly race-conscious perspective
on Rankin. Instead, he couched this understanding in terms that were
consistent with the Black Jurisprudence of which he has been a major
architect. -Marshall concluded,
McPherson's employment-related interaction with the constable was
apparently negligible. Her duties were clearly clerical and were limited
135. The Reagan campaign in 1980 began in Philadelphia, Mississippi, one of the homes of the
Klan. Philadelphia is in the county where three civil rights workers were murdered and buried in an
earthen dam in the 1960s. President Reagan began that campaign by saying that he stood for States'
Rights. Wilkins, Smiling Racism: Ronald Reagan's Race Policies, The Nation, Nov. 3, 1984, at 437.
The slogan "States' Rights" was one of the war cries of the white councils that indirectly ran Missis-
sippi in the early 1960s.
Furthermore, the Reagan Administration adopted a number of positions that were perceived as
anti-black. A Los Angeles Times editorial stated, "In seven years this [Reagan] Justice Department
has campaigned to ... abolish abortion and affirmative action, to secure tax exemptions for private
schools that discriminate against blacks and to abandon the exclusionary rule." Call to Battle, Los
Angeles Times, Mar. 5, 1988, (Metro) at 8, col. 1. See George Curry, Reagan Blasted on Racism
Issue, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 15, 1988, at C3, col. 1. ("The president of the National Urban League
accused the Reagan administration Thursday of creating a national climate that fosters racism. At a
news conference to release its 'State of Black America,' an annual assessment of the status of blacks,
the civil rights group's leader, John Jacob, accused the administration of 'creating a climate in which
racism has been allowed to fester and grow.' ").
In a United Press International release, Terrel Bell, the first Secretary of Education in the Rea-
gan administration, reported the atmosphere among some key Reagan aides as resentful of blacks.
Bell said he never heard racist jokes or sexist comments from the president, Cabinet mem-
bers or colleagues but there "was the evidence of apparent bias among mid-level right-wing
staffers in the White House.... I was shocked to hear their sick humor and racist cliches."
.. "For example, when the bill to establish a national holiday to honor Martin Luther
King Jr. was before the president for his signature or veto, these bigots referred to Dr.
King as 'Martin Lucifer Coon!' . . . They delighted in making other slurs. Arabs were
called 'sand niggers.'"
Tamara Henry, Bell: Some Administration Staff had 'Resentment' Toward Minorities, United Press
Int'l Press Release, Jan. 22, 1988.
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solely to the civil process function of the Constable's office. There is
no indication that she would ever be in a position to further-or indeed
to have any involvement with-the minimal law enforcement activity
engaged in by the Constable's office. Given the function of the agency,
McPherson's position in the office, and the nature of her statement, we
are not persuaded that Rankin's interest in discharging her outweighed
her rights under the First Amendment.1 36
Justice Marshall's opinion focused on the nature of Ms. McPherson's job
in concluding that her comment was so unimportant that the Court need
not look at how much protection the first amendment provides for her
statements. However, Marshall just as easily could have focused on the
statements themselves, concluding that since they were insubstantial and
not personal they were protected, leaving for another day whether some
statements made by some officers would amount to such a direct threat
to the interests of an employer that those interests would have to be bal-
anced against first amendment concerns. Justice Marshall's choice
clearly will influence concerns outside the confines of this case. His opin-
ion urges judges to look at the status of employees in evaluating the pro-
tection given their speech. The Court's approach provided the most
limited protection that could have been provided to black employees
without permitting their discharge.
The Court implicitly, and Justice Scalia explicitly, asks black em-
ployees to subordinate their concerns to the conventional views of the
white majority-if their position is sufficiently powerful to warrant such
conformity. The concession may seem small-after all, it only eliminates
a small part of the possible discourse of black people-but the impact of
that change is substantial for the public discourse and for how black peo-
ple react to employment. Black anger legitimately and nonthreateningly
addressed toward employers or other whites is seen as a legitimate ra-
tionale for discipline and discharge. The growing number of cases in the
employment context that charge employers in racial discrimination cases
with retaliation is stark evidence of this fact.
137
A similar issue of ignoring the concerns of blacks appears in the
Supreme Court's most important recent examination of the death penalty
and race. In McCleskey v. Kemp, 138 Justice Powell stated that the fact
that blacks are executed more frequently than whites, and were executed
at rates several times greater (at statistically significant levels) when they
136. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1986).
137. The total number of charges for race-related retaliation under Title VII has more than
doubled between the fiscal years of 1981 and 1990. In 1981, the total number of charges for race-
related retaliation filed with the EEOC was 3,470, and, in 1990, the number had grown to 7,161.
Records of EEOC (available from author).
138. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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kill whites than when they kill blacks or when whites kill other whites,
does not call into question the basic fairness of the criminal justice
system.
Race is viewed as irrelevant by the five-justice majority in McCles-
key. They ignore black concerns--concerns that are considered irrele-
vant to the fairness of the death penalty. The Court argued that to
accept any other approach would lead to a slippery slope from which the
death penalty system would not be able to escape. 139 This goal certainly
was part of the intention of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to force the
Court to acknowledge the racial inequities in administration of the death
penalty. But the Court provided a very unsatisfactory answer to the
questions posed. The Supreme Court permitted the states to assume that
black people do not have a right to be treated equally as long as the
system seems fair to white victims. From the perspective of white vic-
tims, it is fair to hold black criminals to a higher and different standard.
Being a black victim or a black perpetrator of crimes against black people
does not count as heavily-despite clear evidence that it is an important
part of the decisional process of the judicial system. Race plays a part in
the sentencing of criminals everywhere in this country because race mat-
ters to the participants in the system, both black and white. The problem
for black people is that white people use the imposition of the death pen-
alty to keep black people in their place. This use is an improper one, and
as Justice Brennan suggests, it is up to the state to provide a nonracist
method of imposing the death penalty. 140
139. The Court held that
[I]f we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital
sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty.
Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be
extended to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership
in other minority groups, and even to gender. Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates to
the race of his victim, other claims could apply with equally logical force to statistical
disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other actors in the criminal justice system,
such as defense attorneys, or judges .... As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting
principle to the type of challenge brought by McCleskey. The Constitution does not re-
quire that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially
irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital punish-
ment.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-19 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). This argument ignores the
history of race relations in this country, id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and also suggests the
weakness inherent in the use of statistics to prove discrimination. There will be numerous situations
where the small numbers involved or the correlation between race and other variables masks the
racism in criminal law or employment decisions. The majority does not understand the limitations
inherent in statistics. See id. at 295 n.14. It is not possible to develop a common standard for juries
involved in sentencing defendants to death like the common standards developed in employment
settings.
140. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Does Justice Powell really believe that race is irrelevant, or is he
really contending that as long as it is not done too explicitly it is appro-
priate for juries and employers to use race in making their decisions? It
is more likely that he means the latter. This implicit permission to use
race does not lead to a colorblind society nor to a color neutral society,
although those who urge it on us may believe so. The Court is unwilling
to see the racism inherent in this failure to acknowledge that race mat-
ters. There are few in America who will admit that race does not cloud
the decisions of juries and employers, but there are more and more par-
ticipants who argue that law-in all of its majestic neutrality--ought to
ignore race.
The McCleskey case also has implications for how the courts are
likely to treat the question of discrimination in the future. The Supreme
Court already has stated that some discrimination in the employment
process and in allocating subcontracting dollars is not remediable.
1 4'
This view is a stark reminder of the way in which the Court will and will
not use statistics to prove discrimination. 142
IV. THE SHORT, RECENT HISTORY OF BLACK LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
The nascent movement toward a Black Legal Scholarship has re-
acted to all four parts of the historical treatment of race in the law. I
demonstrate in this Part that the current generation of Black Legal
Scholars 43 has identified the problem but has been reluctant to admit
141. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
142. The McCleskey Court discussed with approval the findings by the district court that Profes-
sor David Baldus' study methodology was flawed. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 288 n.6. Included in this
discussion were the arguments that the 230-variable model is unable to explain more than 48% of
the variance in results and that race is highly correlated with other variables. There are several
problems with this analysis that go to the heart of how to interpret statistics and discrimination. As
the Court itself implicitly acknowledged in its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), neutral factors can disguise racial factors. To look for smoking guns in the debris of such
complicated statistical matters is likely to lead to a situation where race does matter. More impor-
tantly, statistics are used by the relevant actors in employment and criminal law areas, but are
ignored by the courts.
In addition, the failure of a model to explain only part of the results of a complicated process is
not unusual. Statistically, a model with a very small R-squared may be a better model than one
which purports to explain all of the variance. Good models start with good theory, and without
good theory, there are no effective ways of determining the appropriate results.
143. Because of the length of this Article, I have not had the opportunity to deal with the more
recent history of black legal scholars' contributions in the 1970s. I think the contributions of Profes-
sor Derrick Bell at Harvard, Professor James Jones at Wisconsin, Judge and former Professor Harry
Edwards at Michigan and Harvard in the 1970s, Professor Robert Belton at Vanderbilt and Profes-
sor Eleanor Holmes Norton at Georgetown in the early 1980s-to name just a few of the black
scholars-are the potential subject of scholarly treatment. There is much that we could learn from
their scholarship, but it is not possible to be fair to that subject in this Article. I believe that a careful
examination of their scholarship will support my thesis about Black Jurisprudence and Black Legal
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that race ought to be included in our analysis independent of other tools
of legal scholarship. I argue that in order for Black Legal Scholarship to
develop and for the law to perform the tasks that we want it to under-
take, the practitioners of legal scholarship-black and white-must do a
better job of dealing with race.
Until recently, most legal scholarship by blacks took place outside
American law schools. 144 It has been action-oriented and focused on
court decisions. This has been the result of several factors. Predomi-
nately white law schools have not been very interested in having blacks
participate as students, teachers, or scholars in the legal process. There
have been exceptions: Derrick Bell at Harvard Law School and the Uni-
versity of Oregon; William Ming at the University of Chicago; John R.
Wilkins at the University of California; Professor and Ambassador C.
Clyde Ferguson at Harvard, Rutgers, and as Dean of Howard University
Law School; Charles W. Quick at Wayne State Law School and the Uni-
versity of Illinois; and Harry E. Groves at the University of Cincinnati
College of Law, the University of North Carolina, and North Carolina
Central University. These scholars made notable contributions to legal
scholarship. But some of these efforts were ignored by the scholarship
that predominated in white law schools, and for black scholars at pre-
dominately black schools it has been (and probably still is) difficult to get
either the resources or the time away from the classroom that is neces-
sary for pure research.
Certainly, the attitude taken by two illustrious deans of Howard
Law School, William Hastie and Charles Houston, suggests that they felt
their primary task was to train a generation of lawyers who could partici-
pate in the legal struggle for justice under the law. 145 However, this view
of legal education taken by black scholars, in both predominately white
and black schools, although different in perspective and concern from the
view of white scholars, did not permit an attack on the ethnocentric na-
ture of American legal scholarship.
The small number of blacks who were in the legal academy and who
had time to do research wrote with the assumption that the then-current
Scholarship, but some of their early work anticipates the scholarship that some of the new black
scholars have begun.
144. See, e.g. W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880 (1962);
W.E.B. Du Bois, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO (1967). Current black legal scholars have also begun
to look at the accomplishments of earlier black scholars. See J. Clay Smith, Principles Supplement-
ing the Houstonian School of Jurisprudence, 32 How. L.J. 493 (1989). It may be that there was more
early scholarship than we are presently aware of, but it should also be clear that much of that
scholarship was ignored by white writers.
145. See August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, Attorneys Black and White: A Case Study of Race
Relations within the NAACP, in ALONG THE COLOR LINE, supra note 37, at 128-56. 1
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structure of legal discourse was fixed. As an example, Professor Ming
argued that the Supreme Court's opinion in the Restrictive Covenant
Cases 146 provided at least one avenue that had been closed to blacks by
the Civil Rights Cases. Professor Ming pointed out that the Court,
although denying the enforceability of the Reconstruction civil rights
statutes with respect to private behavior, had acknowledged that blacks
had rights. 147 The majority in the Civil Rights Cases argued,
An individual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold prop-
erty, to buy and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a witness or a juror;
he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of the right in a
particular case; he may commit an assault against the person.., or
slander the good name of a fellow citizen; but, unless protected in these
wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot
destroy or injure the right; he will only render himself amenable to
satisfaction or punishment .... 148
Professor Ming picked up on a question asked fifteen years before by
Professor Robert Hale,149 and he argued that the Restrictive Covenant
Cases suggested that the fourteenth amendment requires states to pro-
vide affirmative protection against the acts of providers of public accom-
modations.150 Professor Ming's analysis was ahead of its time in several
ways. He successfully incorporated the latest social science research into
his article15' and his economic analysis, especially for the time, was very
good. 152
Although Professor Ming did a first-class analysis of the early race
cases, he did not question the assumption that the Constitution is what
the Supreme Court has discerned from the entrails of the Framers and
the post-bellum drafters of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.
146. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) [hereinafter
Restrictive Covenant Cases] (holding that it was state action for state courts to enforce private con-
tracts that excluded purchasers of property on racial grounds).
147. Compare the sophisticated analysis of this history in the article by Professor Ming with the
discussion in Judge Bork's new book. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA supra note 91, at 151-
53, 324. Judge Bork does not understand the historical background of this case. He writes as if
Shelley were invented out of whole cloth.
148. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883) (emphasis added). See Ming, Racial
Restrictions, supra note 24, at 203, 236-37 (1948).
149. See Ming, Racial Restrictions, supra note 24, at 238 (quoting Robert Hale, Force and the
State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 185
(1935)).
150. See id. at 238.
151. See id. at 208-11, nn.18-23.
152. See id. at 217-20. Ming argues that some of the suggested ways of getting around the
decision in the Restrictive Covenant Cases are unlikely to be adopted because of their cost to the
participants. He almost makes the point that the economic rationale for the Restrictive Covenant
Cases is that it provides a cheap method for whites to enforce their prejudices and that most of the
alternatives simply are too costly.
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Race did not matter to Professor Ming's analysis precisely because he
understood that it did not matter to the Supreme Court or to his Univer-
sity of Chicago colleagues. This assumption was not challenged directly
by Ming or his black contemporaries in the law schools in the 1950s and
1960s.
But this does not mean that these often ingenious lawyers did not
challenge the system. They altered the system so that the scope of the
equal protection clause was extended not only to blacks and other racial
minorities but to women, aliens, illegitimate children, and occasionally
indigents-and the scope of the rights of all Americans was enlarged.
15 3
Although blacks were successful in challenging racial restrictions and
impediments before Brown, they never have shaken the view expressed
repeatedly by the Court that the law has to be viewed through the lenses
of white Americans. This transformation accepts the legal world as it is,
a product of the white framers and interpreters. Justice Harlan put it
best just before he excoriated the majority's opinion in Plessy. Harlan
said:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in
power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains
true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitu-
tional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there
is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is
no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights all citizens are
equal before the law. 154
Justice Harlan was wrong. The Constitution was written from the per-
spective of white citizens with only their interests in mind. When the
Constitution said "we the people," it is very likely that they did not have
black people, free or slave, in mind. Of course, Chief Justice Taney had
been wrong when he suggested that the Constitution had provided no
rights for blacks. 155 Blacks, even slaves and those not born in America,
had been accorded rights under the state and federal constitutions. The
problem was that no white founder believed that these rights should in-
clude participation by black Americans in establishing the basic constitu-
tional structure.
Several black legal scholars recently have raised the importance of
the black perspective on legal issues. There are five recent and important
examples of black legal scholarship: an article and a short comment by
153. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 96.
154. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added),
155. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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Randall Kennedy, 5 6 a Foreword to the Harvard Law Review by Derrick
Bell,' 57 a series of articles by Patricia Williams on the notion of rights,1 58
and an article by Charles Lawrence. 59 In each, the author takes on as-
pects of the legal scholarship that I have tried to describe, but none has
gone far enough in actually breaking away from the assumptions that
underlie Black Jurisprudence. Each author deals with different aspects
of discrimination that are products of the historical treatment of blacks
in our legal system. Several of the authors deal with aspects of the pater-
nalism in the law. Some question the notions of deference inherent in
traditional interpretations of the Constitution and statutes. None of
these powerful analyses, however, are able to step completely outside the
notions of race inherited from our constitutional and judicial past (and
no doubt neither will I).
This failure to completely reject the assumptions that underlie the
legal rules produced by Black Jurisprudence also is true of the black non-
lawyers who have commented on legal questions concerning the position
of black Americans for the last twenty-five years-primarily the black
social scientists: Thomas Sowell, 16° Glenn Loury, 16 1 and William Julius
Wilson, 162 and the black historian, Harold Cruse, 163 who have written
critically about the civil rights movement and its objectives.
In an article in the 100th anniversary issue of the Harvard Law Re-
view, Philip Elman described much of the gains of the civil rights era as
the product of the fortuitous actions of Philip Elman and Justice Frank-
furter. 164 In his brief response, Professor Kennedy noted that Elman's
view is paternalistic: "One of the problems with Elman's analysis is its
parochialism; he views the situation wholly from the perspective of the jus-
156. R. Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, supra note 5; R. Kennedy, Race Relations Law and
the Tradition of Celebration, supra note 5.
157. Bell, Foreword, supra note 25; see also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987);
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest-Convergence] (interests of races converged in Brown);
Derrick Bell, Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 5 (1976) (white political pressure for racial superiority predicted to continue).
158. Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987) [hereinafter P. Williams, Alchemical Notes].
159. Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
160. THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE 199-202 (1983).
161. Glenn Loury, "'Matters of Color"--Blacks and The Constitutional Order, 86 PUBLIC IN-
TEREST, Winter 1987, at 109.
162. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 109-24 (1987).
163. H. CRUSE, supra note 39.
164. Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litiga-
tion, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987).
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tices."1 65 Kennedy does not deal with the question of why that is impor-
tant, but he makes clear that Philip Elman's unstated premise of the
white salvation of blacks is inappropriate. In rejecting Elman's claims of
authority over civil rights progress, Kennedy takes the first step toward
Black Legal Scholarship.
Professor Charles Lawrence outlined the argument for how to frame
the question of race by asking:
What is the neutral principle that the equal protection clause embod-
ies? And why would that principle encompass intentional racial stig-
matization but not those cases identified by the cultural meaning test?
.... [W]hen one finds that intentional racial discrimination is morally
reprehensible but that unconscious racial stigmatization is not, one has
made a value choice that defines the "neutral" principle of antidis-
crimination in terms that adopt one world view and reject another.166
Professor Lawrence understood that neutral principles are the strait-
jacket that prevents judges from dealing with unconscious racism. Yet
he was unwilling to attack the problem at its source-race. He at-
tempted to cast his argument in the shadow of the arguments by tradi-
tional liberals, such as John Hart Ely and Paul Brest, and to respond to
the more radical arguments of Alan Freeman. 167 However, his efforts to
tie his worldview into the liberals' critiques of current court and legal
dogma fail precisely because these critiques ultimately take for granted
the perspective of the white world.1 68
The confines of this Article do not permit a full treatment of all the
arguments of these "traditional" liberal scholars, but it is sufficient to
deal with those of Alan Freeman.1 69 Freeman argued that the world
should be viewed historically from the perspective of victims and perpe-
trators, and that American law has adopted the view of the perpetrators
and not the victims in depicting the changing world. Freeman argued,
The Brown case surely had to do with more than education. It was the
official American statement that racial discrimination had become ille-
gal (and immoral). The meaning of such a statement, to a black Amer-
ican in the fifties (or even now) must include an expectation that there
will be, when the task is completed, some significant change in the
conditions of life that one associates with the past practices of discrimi-
165. R. Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, supra note 5, at 1947 (emphasis added).
166. Lawrence, supra note 159, at 383-84 (emphasis added).
167. See Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical
Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988).
168. See id. at 383-88.
169. See Alan Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Rationalization, in
SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 71 (Derrick Bell ed. 1980)
[hereinafter SHADES OF BROWN].
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nation-segregated schools, lack of jobs, the worst jobs, lack of polit-
ical power. 
170
Freeman went on to characterize civil rights law in the following fashion:
The present goal would seem to be to legitimize the accomplishments
of civil rights law by emphasizing and displaying a small but successful
black middle class, and seeking to gain its allegiance while ignoring the
victim perspective claims of the vast and disproportionate numbers of
poor and unemployed black people.
Thus, despite the uniqueness of race as an historical problem of
oppression, it cannot be remedied alone unless one is willing to accept
nothing more than token bourgeoisification within the structure of a
presupposed system of equality of opportunity-in short, one must be-
come part of the legitimation process. To challenge that limited view
is to tackle the pretense of equality of opportunity directly, and to see it
for what it is in relation to class structure.
17 1
Freeman asked the appropriate question-how should black people's
perspective contribute to looking at the problem of race? His answer
nonetheless contained the same mistake as the traditional legal analysis.
Freeman was unable to transform his real sympathy for black victims
into a black perspective on equal protection and Brown. Brown did sub-
stantially change the world. Freeman ultimately was unable to see these
changes because he viewed Brown from the perspective of the majority of
our society. The decision was not simply the product of the concerns of
the Supreme Court. The changes that took place not only were accom-
plished by the actions of nine white justices, but were the result of the
planning and the blood of our black parents and grandparents, and some
of the efforts of the people of my generation. To ignore the changes that
Brown created is to misunderstand the conditions in which black people
existed before the Court acted. Black people always have known that
freedom would not be won in a day, even if they have not always ex-
pressed this concern. The role of the courts in providing change for
black people will always partially be a product of the changes created by
the black people. 172 Black Americans also understand that both of these
kinds of changes are real.
173
170. Id. at 73.
171. Id. at 88 (emphasis added); see also Freeman, supra note 167. Professor Freeman deals
explicitly with the difficulty of being white and writing on issues of race and how he believes the
issues play out for him. Richard Delgado, however, argues that there are some points about racism
that Alan Freeman cannot see as a white person. See Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and
the Realities of Race-Does the Fundamental Contradiction have a Corollary, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 407 (1988).
172. See H. GUTMAN, supra note 118, at 3-44.
173. Black people even sometimes suggest that they believe that there has been no change when
in fact they mean, if I read them correctly, that black people have exaggerated the gains. See Bell,
Interest-Convergence, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 169, at 91.
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Freeman misunderstands this perspective because he has not suc-
cessfully adopted the position of the black victim. Instead, he remains
outside and above the black victim and suggests what ought to be done to
save her. I do not mean to suggest that Freeman's effort is not useful, but
rather that he has not done what he claims to have done. This point is
clearest in the last part of the quoted passage. For Freeman, indeed for
all Critical Legal Studies adherents, race does not matter outside its in-
teraction with class and other concerns. Class matters, and so does race,
but the law has to deal with the racial question irrespective of the extent
to which class concerns are addressed. 174
Charles Lawrence understands that there is a problem with the
Freeman perspective. Yet, in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, he
was unable to find the true problem, because he was not quite willing to
argue that race matters in and of itself-not disguised as class or im-
mersed in other claims of justice or neutrality. Race matters and must be
dealt with independently of these other important concerns. Lawrence
argued that psychological perspectives can help us to understand why
and how race is important, but he continued to search for a neutral way
to argue for the importance of race without finding race to be important
as a perspective in and of itself. Race is not only unconscious in the
Lawrence sense, but it is conscious in that all of the participants in the
legal system begin their arguments with the perspective of the white ma-
jority. This is precisely what Black Jurisprudence must change if law is
to be a more effective tool for eradicating discrimination in the future.
Lawrence's excellent article is not the only part of the movement
toward a Black Legal Scholarship that is unwilling to make that leap of
faith necessary to appreciate and use blackness. In some ways, Professor
Patricia Williams comes closest to making the necessary leap of faith in
an article that is both moving and brilliant. 175 She argues that blacks do
not have to give up rights, but rather they must redefine them in terms
that provide them to all people, rocks, cows, and trees. t76 This ironic
conclusion to an article that neatly understands and presents the basic
elements of how black and whites think about and deal with notions of
rights may be as close as we can come to transcending rights. Unfortu-
nately, it is difficult to find a solution to these issues on the basis of Wil-
liams' redefinition. She does not provide us with a blueprint for how she
came to that conclusion. One answer is that she came to that conclusion
the same way that Freeman did. She accepts the notion, implicitly at the
174. See Jerome Culp, Children of the Darkness and Children of the Light: A Review of Criti-
cal Legal Studies and Race (1987) (unpublished manuscript available from author).
175. P. Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 158.
176. See id. at 432-33.
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very nether regions of her consciousness, that rights exist as white Amer-
icans have defined them. Professor Williams understands that blacks
have to speak their own language and need to contribute their own per-
spective to law and legal scholarship, but she is unable to provide a
blueprint that would allow us to progress in this endeavor. Just as Free-
man loses the importance of race in notions of power and class that tran-
scend race, Williams seeks to have rights that will transcend race.
There are three things that tie together these tentative efforts toward
a Black Legal Scholarship. First, all of these scholars have asked how
race fits into modern legal scholarship and practice. 177 Second, all of the
practitioners have concluded that the existing perspective propounded by
most legal scholars, particularly white scholars, lacks a black
perspective.178
Finally, most of these authors also have framed their arguments in
very personal and unconventional terms. Dean Bell has turned into a
novelist, whereas part of the cogency of both Professor Williams' and
Professor Lawrence's arguments stems from the unconventional begin-
ning or structure of their arguments. Like Feminist Legal Scholarship,
Black Legal Scholarship must change the boundaries of analysis. These
approaches to the problem are ways to deal with the first three descrip-
tions of the history of the legal relationship of blacks in American law-
ignoring blacks, paternalism, and external regulation. This history limits
the ability of blacks to be heard, and when they are heard, limits their
language to the kind of cadences that can be understood by traditional
scholars.
None of these very important efforts deal with the fourth stage of
the legal relationship of blacks with the law-black Americans who par-
ticipate in the legal environment deferring to the interests of the white
majority. Blacks are still asked to defer their interests to those of the
white majority. Those scholars, all nonlawyers, who have attempted to
address these issues from a conservative perspective have made the same
mistakes. The most visible person to make these mistakes is Thomas
Sowell.
177. See Bell, Foreword, supra note 25; Harlon Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 435 (1987); R. Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, supra note 5; R. Kennedy, The Tradition
of Celebration, supra note 5; Lawrence, supra note 159 (contrasts psychological evidence of uncon-
scious racism with current theoretical models of how the legal system should respond; Lawrence
proposes a test that would look to the "cultural meaning" of acts to determine if a significant portion
of the population thought of the government act in racial terms-if so, the Court should apply
heightened scrutiny); P. Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 158.
178. The best example of this argument, cast in illuminating simplicity, is Randall Kennedy's
comment on the work of Benno Schmidt, now President of Yale University. See R. Kennedy, The
Tradition of Celebration, supra note 5.
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Sowell's argument can be divided into two parts. First, he argues
that race is not an important issue for legal determinations because race
is not an important factor in determining the social, legal, or economic
position of black people. He concludes that race is dwarfed as an explan-
atory variable by other race-neutral factors-notably age,' 79 number of
children, 180 period since immigrant left rural area,181 cultural attrib-
utes, 182 and geographic location. 183 Second, Sowell argues that although
"affirmative action" has not been effective in eliminating racial discrimi-
nation, "equal opportunity" has been successful.184
The question that should be asked of Sowell is similar to the ques-
tion posed above to Professors Williams and Lawrence. Why has he
adopted an argument that is not supported by the data? He is not a dupe
of white interests.' 85 Sowell is clearly reacting against the paternalism
that he finds prevalent in American academia, but his response is to
adopt a special form of Black Jurisprudence. He accepts the white per-
spective as a given and assumes that black people will have to adapt their
view of law to that perspective. If blacks are poor it is because they have
been stuck with the wrong cultural values. If blacks do not excel in edu-
cation at the same rate as whites, he argues that it is because they have
been pushed too fast into the wrong programs by liberals attempting to
paternalistically help black people. Sowell concludes that the law and
the economic systems are fair to black Americans because they are fair to
whites and occasionally to blacks. From scant data he builds an argu-
179. See THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 257-58 (1980) (quoting Sowell,
Ethnicity in a Changing America, DAEDALUS, Winter 1978, at 213, 221); THOMAS SOWELL, MAR-
KETS AND MINORITIES 10-13 (1981); THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE
189-91 (1983).
180. T. SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES, supra note 179, at 15-17; T. SOWELL, KNOWL-
EDGE AND DECISIONS, supra note 179, at 81-113.
181. Thomas Sowell, Three Black Histories, in AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 48-49 (Thomas
Sowell ed. 1978).
182. Id.
183. T. SOWELL, supra note 36, at 13-15.
184. Sowell is systematically wrong about both of these points. Within the limited scope of this
paper it is not possible to examine all of the things that Sowell identifies as more important than race.
For Sowell's argument that equal opportunity has been effective, see Thomas Sowell, Are Quotas
Good for Blacks?, 65 COMMENTARY 39, 39-43 (June 1978). But see T. SOWELL, supra note 36.
Walter Williams, an economist, has also written extensively, if not well, about these legal points. His
contribution to describing how one ought to look at race can be summarized in this quote:
Throughout ... discussion[s] of race, runs the common theme: There are collective forces
that seek to deny blacks socioeconomic opportunity which must be offset by some other
force in order to give blacks equal chances. It is this general intellectual thrust that will be
challenged throughout this book. Does group socioeconomic progress depend upon
whether the general society likes or dislikes the group in question?
WALTER WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS 2 (1982). In short, race matters to Williams
only to the extent it is a proxy for something important that is being masked by race.
185. See, e.g., Sowell, Three Black Histories, supra note 181.
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ment for a world in which race is irrelevant-despite the tremendous
amount of data to suggest that race matters now more than ever in deter-
mining the place of black Americans in our society. Sowell grapples, as
do so many others, with the wrongly-held view that race ought to be
wholly unimportant. Race neutrality may be the right goal, but our legal
system cannot achieve that goal now, nor does it appear to provide a
future path to legal and economic equality for black people.
V. CONCLUSION
[Hie. .. was no longer a Black Aesthetician. In fact, he had written
more than one essay suggesting that the legacy of that aesthetic-its
defensive chauvinism and mystical reliance on "race"-was detrimen-
tal to the progress of both black literature and criticism.... In the
ranks of the Black Aesthetic, what occurred during the mid-seventies
was a slip behind the back of consciousness.... Such slips are unob-
served transformations of self in the dialectics of the spirit. The charge
of apostasy leveled at any former member of the Black Aesthetic has,
often, been merely a stunned response to his objectification of one's
other self emergent from the blind side of one's own spirit. The apos-
tate-lo-and-behold-is simply one's "self-already-moved."..... I know
that what I, like the poor pilgrim traveler of the sorrow songs, found in
my movement away from the Black Aesthetic was that the voyage out
is, always already, the journey back.
186
Legal Scholarship is black to the extent that it raises and deals with
the black condition in American society from a black perspective. Amer-
ican legal scholarship occasionally has dealt with black concerns; how-
ever, this treatment has almost universally been from the perspective of
the white majority. Black views are ignored and their concerns are
subordinated to overriding issues of how black questions impact on white
rights. To paraphrase Kenneth Stampp, to the proponents of Black Ju-
risprudence the question is simply how to create a legal system that con-
siders blacks to be "white men with black skins, nothing more and
nothing less."187 This view, as I have noted above, does not deal signifi-
186. HOUSTON A. BAKER, JR., AFRO-AMERICAN POETICS 140-43 (1988).
187. KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM
SOUTH at vii (paperback ed. 1956). This phrasing of the issue caused some controversy in the histor-
ical literature, but Stampp notes:
I did not, of course, assume that there have been, or are today, no cultural differences
between white and black Americans. Nor do I regard it as flattery to call Negroes white
men with black skins. It would serve my purpose as well to call Caucasians black men
with white skins. I have simply found no convincing evidence that there are any significant
differences between the innate emotional traits and intellectual capacities of Negroes and
whites.
Id. at ix. See David Davis, Slavery and the Post-World War II Historians, in SLAVERY, COLONIAL-
ISM AND RACISM 1-10 (Sidney W. Mintz ed. 1974) (examining the influence of Stampp's Peculiar
Institution on the development of scholarship examining slavery).
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cantly with the other problems created by the differential and discrimina-
tory treatment of blacks in the American legal system.1 88  Blacks are
subjected to differential treatment at almost every level of society because
of the color of their skin. This differential treatment will not disappear if
we ignore race. The problem is not simply that race matters to those
who treat blacks differently. Race matters in almost as many important
ways to those who would like to have blacks treated equally. But the
proponents of equality have concluded that equality should be on white
terms.
If one adopts the full panoply of new tools provided by Black Legal
Scholarship to the task of interpreting the Constitution, it is clear that
race matters in the present Supreme Court's interpretation. More impor-
tantly, the justices often are unaware of how race matters or when it
should matter.
An additional view needs to be addressed-the concern that Black
Legal Scholarship is an inappropriate perspective. In this view, white
people helped to form this country, and they have a right to determine
the contours of its growth and development. Black people are not meant
to be treated differently, at least formally, but they should understand
that this is a white country. 189 This view is wrong and it is wrong for the
very reason that it is attempting to create tacitly what it denies explicitly.
Constitutional rights were created to prevent those in London who did
not understand the concerns of the colonists from destroying important
American values. Black people ask only that they be part of the forma-
tion of law and constitutional protections.
188. Others will, of course, question this conclusion. There is some evidence at least in the area
of religious faith and belief that the African past of the black slaves of America significantly im-
pacted white as well as black Americans in the antebellum South. See MECHAL SOBEL, THE
WORLD THEY MADE TOGETHER: BLACK AND WHITE VALUES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIR-
GINIA (1987). I do not contend that there is no black influence on the law, but that this influence is
almost never acknowledged and even when it is, the scope and importance of the black impact is
both underestimated and misunderstood.
189. There are several analogous arguments made by movement conservatives about other situa-
tions. This argument is the moral equivalent of the argument made by Senator S.I. Hayakawa, who
said about the Panama Canal, "It's ours. We stole it fair and square." Stanley Meisler, Combat in
Panama: Panamanians Have a Long History of Dependence on U.S., Los Angeles Times, Dec. 21,
1989, at A7, col.1. Many people believe that white Americans justly deserve credit for this enduring
constitutional history and that they should not have to be subject to the vagaries of a black culture
derived from black cultures in Africa that produced Idi Amin and cannibalism. This, of course,
ignores the rather recent products of Western culture, which include the genocide of the Jews by
Germany and the dropping of the atomic bomb on nonwhite Japan to end the war. Just as all black
people and cultures are not responsible for dictatorship or cannibalism, Western culture is not re-
sponsible for all of the evils of the 20th century. The West, of course, does not have a monopoly on
truth and justice and if it is to reach its potential it will have to learn from other cultures.
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A final question should be addressed by this Article: Whether a
Black Legal Scholarship is consistent with the Constitution as an antifac-
tional document. One of the great victories in the constitutional conven-
tion was that the document would be read as limiting the ability of
factions to exist and to dominate the government. Cass Sunstein has re-
cently described the issues presented by this constitutional compro-
mise.190 Sunstein argues that unlike much current political theory, the
Framers did not look at the world through the lenses of pure private
interest. They, in fact, thought they had killed interest as a separate issue
when they adopted the Constitution. 191 Can Black Legal Scholarship be
made consistent with this constitutional vision? The Constitution at-
tempts to eliminate factions by arguing for ways of eliminating the need
for faction and by substituting the need to create the public good. I be-
lieve that race is really a faction that the Constitution always has in-
cluded in its balancing. The task for judges, lawyers, and students is not
to ignore faction but to understand how it shapes our legal world and is
already included in the Constitution. Our role as scholars is to be faith-
ful in our scholarship to the racial reality that exists in the law. All of us
in our work bring our assumptions and our being to the computer termi-
nal. The computer may not know our race but our words, actions, and
speculations are a direct product of the racial role we play. White schol-
ars can either play master to our role as legal scholarly mammies, or they
can help us to develop roles for black and white scholars that deal with
our existence inside current legal regimes. In any case, black legal schol-
ars are beginning to make that difficult journey from mammy to militant
and back again. Along the way they may begin or end as apostate, but
they must begin to travel this path and they must follow wherever it




[A mythical conversation in Duke Law School Faculty Lounge shortly
after Toward a Black Legal Scholarship was completed and circulated.]
190. Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
191. The Framers went out of their way to eliminate the need for parties, but of course the
notion of parties has persisted and grown at least until recent times. In some sense, parties are the
most durable aspect of the American republic. Blacks and women and the nonpropertied have ob-
tained the franchise, states lost their representation in Washington with the direct election of sena-
tors, and the balance of power between the president and Congress, and state and federal institutions
have all changed, but the notion of two parties representing approximately the same interests has
endured for almost the entire history of the country.
192. In the original version of this Epilogue I included names of my colleagues who I had
thought of when I created this fictional conversation. Although almost everyone I included in this
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[FIRST WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I just finished Black Legal Scholarship.
You've started something that will change how I teach con law and consti-
tutional history-
[JEROME GULP]: Thanks, you can't imagine how much work I put into
that-
[FIRST WHITE COLLEAGUE]: But I wonder whether most of my col-
leagues will to have a dog in this fight.
[JEROME GULP]: I don't know what you mean. I spent seventy pages and
two hundred footnotes showin'" as they say on the street corner, that Amer-
ican law is the history of black people. For your colleagues to say they do
not want a dog in that fight is to ignore what the fight is about.
[SECOND WHITE COLLEAGUE]: Haven't you altered your constitutional
law class because of Catharine MacKinnon, 
193 and Martha Minow? 194
[THIRD WHITE COLLEAGUE]: All of us have been influenced by the re-
minder that we do not have a single experience, but I am not quite sure
how I should do Black Legal Scholarship. Black concerns are explored in
my criminal law course-but I take it that's not Black Legal Scholarship.
[JEROME CULP]: That depends on the content of the discussion and the
level of the issues that are explored. I am asking you to take a 90 degree
change in the perspective you use to teach legal questions.
[THIRD WHITE COLLEAGUE]: Even if you can re-educate the previously
uninitiated in the teaching of Black Legal Scholarship-
[JEROME CULP]: For many an impossible task-
[THIRD WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I'm still not convinced that I know the
blueprint for how to be a Black Legal Scholar.
[FIRST WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I can see you as [nodding at Culp] the
black pied piper of the legal community blowing a New Orleans' horn-as
the white intellectually ignorant learn new moves.
[chuckles]
discourse gave me approval to use their names, I removed the actual names because I thought that
there is a certain quality of forced good humor associated with the use of the actual names.
However, because one of the purposes of this Article and this Epilogue is to open conversation, and
since I often engage in conversations of this type with my colleagues, I hope that this conversation
will be read in that spirit.
193. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 80. Catharine MacKinnon, a white, female professor of
law at the University of Michigan, has been an outspoken critic of the treatment of women in the
law.
194. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987). Martha Minow is a white woman, a Harvard Law School professor, and
a leading constitutional expert and a feminist.
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[THIRD WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I am willing to be convinced that I could
have written differently about the grand jury or on the management func-
tion of the courts, but how to do Black Legal Scholarship is to me still
inchoate.
[FOURTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I don't think that there can be a black
legal income tax law or a black economics separate from white economics.
Should blacks have additional deductions to take account of racism? Or
should there be a longer period for blacks to file their returns because
many of their ancestors were slaves?
[JEROME CULP]: I don't know if blacks should have more deductions
than whites, I haven't made a detailed study of how the income laws im-
pact blacks.
[FOURTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: Not enough is known. Certainly, we
could help to do more and better studies on blacks and income taxes, but I
take it that is not Black Legal Scholarship.
[SECOND WHITE COLLEAGUE]: There aren't very many blacks who teach
tax law or who do research in that area. Is that part of your point?
[JEROME CULP]: Yes. But my point is more complex. My tax colleagues
have stated these arguments in their most negative terms. There may be a
income tax problem that would benefit from being viewed in a black per-
spective, but until you look, how will anyone know? To what extent have
our tax laws been distorted now and historically by the question of slavery
and continuing racism? Certainly taxation issues were included in the
constitutional concerns about how slaves as property would be treated.
[FIFrH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I teach about Bob Jones. 195 However, the
notion you attribute to Black Jurisprudence Ifind a more attractive start-
ingpointfor discussions of these issues because it treats everyone the same.
[JEROME CULP]: It does if you have the wherewithal to hire a tax lawyer
and the good fortune to not be shoved into a disconcerting position because
you are black
[SIXTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: Isn't that just Critical Legal Studies in
blackface?
[SEVENTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: Watch out, you are about to be flushed
out of the-Augean Stables we call this law school.
[laughter]
195. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1982).
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[SIXTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: How do you differ from Alan Freeman 1 9 6
or others who have written on black concerns in that movement? They
believe, ifI read them correctly, that they have incorporated your concerns
into their perspective. Are you trying to put a more conventional, indeed
conservative, covering over the same arguments?
[JEROME CULP]: No, No, No. I sometimes wonder if that dog referred to
by my colleague [First White Colleague] or law professors can hunt at all.
What are we teaching in our law school classes if it doesn't include black
perspectives? The whole point of my article is that there are different ori-
entations for the law, but if my colleagues can't see the point, how will the
students?
[SEVENTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: If you lie down with dogs and law
professors, particularly law professors, you are likely to rise with fleas.
American law teachers are unlikely to adopt your approach precisely be-
cause they fear the little infestations that will arise with such an infatua-
tion with Black Legal Scholarship.
[EIGHTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: Isn't the point, Jerome, that if you are
right, there is no stopping point? If I am to include Catharine MacKinnon
in my Constitutional Law course, why not Phyllis Schlafly197 or, if I am to
assign Jerome Culp, why not Thomas Sowell? 1 98 Sowell has written on
some constitutional law issues and he, too, has an economic perspective
and he is black If I include only Sowell or Schlafly, is that sufficient to
represent the black and feminists interests, or should I simply assign Stan-
ley Fish? 199 He could represent both the feminist and black critical schol-
arship. In any case, as I read the Constitution, these perspectives are not
illegitimate, they just do not help the court or law professor understand the
issues. The best way for courts to put race behind them is to put it behind
them. Race matters in the same way and to the same degree that a whole
196. See Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 120 (Allan Hutchinson ed.
1989). Alan Freeman is a white male law professor now at SUNY-Buffalo, and one of the early
participants in the critical legal studies movement. He has written powerfully about racial
discrimination.
197. Phyllis Schlafly is a white female lawyer, a housewife, and conservative opponent of many
feminist concerns, and she has been head of the Eagle Foundation, a conservative legal pressure
group.
198. See THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(1990). Thomas Sowell, now a senior researcher at the Hoover Institute, is a leading black conserva-
tive economist. He has written numerous books on a range of issues, including affirmative action
and how law functions.
199. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989). Stanley Fish is a white male
professor of English and Law at Duke University. Professor Fish has been in the forefront of bring-
ing critical theory into legal discussions.
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host of issues matters. The proper way to eliminate them is not go back to
some Meesian original intent, but to go forward, understanding the values
that our Constitution has, sometimes imperfectly, incorporated in its
provisions.
[JEROME CULP]: The issue is not putting a black in your course but under-
standing that there are some common reference points for all blacks in
thinking about the law and legal change. It would not be improper for
someone to come to your view on interpretation of the Constitution based
upon the principles of Black Legal Scholarship, though I think it is very
unlikely, but they have to travel a different road to reach that point that
you advocate.
[SIXTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: You don't deal with Randall Kennedy's ar-
gument 200 that there is no such thing as Black Legal Scholarship. Hasn't
he shown that this effort is fruitless?
[JEROME CULP]: We all bring our experiences to our writing. Certainly,
if we look at Randy's body of work it is part of what I would call Black
Legal Scholarship. He has not proven to me that Black Legal Scholarship
cannot or should not exist. Randy's critique misses the point of this con-
versation. Saying that there are not enough blacks with the requisite skills
who are doing scholarship-the pool problem-does not deal with the
larger issue that race matters in shaping the pool and in what we value.
You are having this conversation with me precisely because my race mat-
ters. If I agree with Randy Kennedy, it means more than if some of my
white colleagues agree. That is the part of what Black Legal Scholarship
brings to legal scholarship. Black perspectives can and should help us to
learn and to teach others just as much as white perspectives can and should
do the same thing.
[BLACK COLLEAGUE]: I believe your article advances our understanding
of the problems inherent in legal scholarship and the poverty of racial un-
derstanding that scholarship reflects. But weren't you really talking to two
different audiences when you argue for the adoption of a Black Legal
Scholarship and for the inclusion of blacks in legal teaching and writing?
One argument is likely to be directed at the primarily black group of law
professors who write about how the law uses and abuses black Americans-
those you exhort to go out and do Black Legal Scholarship. The other part
of your article is addressed to all law teachers and students-primarily
white-whom you ask to incorporate more of the black perspective in un-
derstanding and interpreting the law and the Constitution. Aren't those
200. See R. Kennedy, supra note 12. Randall Kennedy is a black male professor of Law at
Harvard Law School. He has argued that minority scholars have not proven their criticism about
the legal academy.
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really conflicting goals, and aren't your messages to both audiences likely
to be lost in the effort to include both of them in the same article?
[JEROME CULP]: In order to have black scholars taken seriously and
Black Legal Scholarship adopted, it is necessary to legitimate it-just as in
some sense you and a small group of others help to legitimate the role of
blacks in legal history and the role of black scholars in that interpretive
process. Blacks have to convince both themselves and their white col-
leagues and students that their view of the law is important and can play a
role in legal interpretation. This has to be done simultaneously. To bifur-
cate the process is to lose whatever chance there is of actually doing either.
If black scholars who worry about Black Legal Scholarship are not con-
vinced that it is alright to include it in their classes, then they will be
Stanfordized 20 by their students and colleagues.
[NINTH WHITE COLLEAGUE]: I read your article carefully; and you ar-
gue that blacks see the world differently. Does this mean that only blacks
can do black scholarship? Some white judges seem to have been more con-
cerned with issues that you describe as Black Jurisprudence and Black
Legal Scholarship than some black judges.
[JEROME CULP]: I was recently reading David Walker's Appeal which
was seen by the South as a direct appeal for revolt by the vast black popula-
tion. David Walker was a black abolitionist of the early 1800s. Walker
'replied to the racism in Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia,20 2 in
particular to the argument that since the Greek slaves were men of sub-
stance in the sciences and the arts that the problem of blacks was not a
white-imposed condition of black Americans, but was a product of nature.
I have it here; 'l read it to you. Walker said,
For let no one of us suppose that the refutations which have been writ-
ten by our white friends are enough-they are whites-we are blacks.
We, and the world wish to see the charges of Mr. Jefferson refuted by
the blacks themselves, according to their chance; for we must remem-
ber that what the whites have written respecting this subject, is other
men's labours, and did not emanate from the blacks. I know well, that
there are some talents and learning among the coloured people of this
country, which we have not a chance to develope, in consequence of
oppression; but our oppression ought not to hinder us from acquiring
all we can. For we will have a chance to develope them by and by.
God will not suffer us, always to be oppressed. Our sufferings will
come to an end, in spite of all the Americans this side of eternity.
201. This refers to the incident at Stanford Law School in which Derrick Bell was convinced to
participate in a series of lectures that, unbeknownst to him, were to supplement his "inadequate"
teaching of constitutional law.
202. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (William Peden ed. 1954)
(1787).
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Then we will want all the learnings and talents among ourselves, and
perhaps more, to govern ourselves.---"Every dog must have its day,"
the American's is coming to an end.
20 3
Everyone has to do black scholarship if it is to succeed. My article is about
starting a conversation about that process so that blacks in legal situations
can truly have their day-in order to make the American dream include
black people and their ambitions.
203. DAVID WALKER, APPEAL TO THE COLORED CITIZENS OF THE WORLD, BUT IN PARTICU-
LAR, AND VERY EXPRESSLY, TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 14-15 (Charles
Wiltse ed. 1965) (1829).
